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 This dissertation focuses on addressing some critical shortcomings in recent 
developments of the field of strategic management with three essays; shortcomings in 
the ubiquitous Resource Based View (RBV) on matters regarding the origins and 
processes of value creation; shortcomings in alliance management capability (AMC) 
research with regard to explaining the determinants of alliance formation; shortcomings 
of a traditional portfolio theory based approach toward explaining risk preference in the 
formation of alliances.    
The second chapter of this dissertation deals with the first essay. This chapter 
argues value originates from a basic asymmetry in the perceptions and resources of 
various stakeholders in a value chain –consumers, firm, and suppliers. Such asymmetry 
inherently occurs due to bounded rationality and resource constraint of the stakeholders. 
However, this asymmetry evolves through competitive interactions among stakeholders. 
Thus, this chapter develops a dynamic approach to firm value creation emphasizing 
interactions between a firm’s internal growth processes and external changes in its 
market environment.  
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The third chapter of this dissertation, the second essay, focuses on the missing 
determinants of strategic alliance formation in an alliance management capability 
(AMC) explanation. This chapter suggested three missing factors: 1) basic limits in the 
number of alliances a firm can effectively manage, 2) absorptive capacity, and 3) a 
firm’s external competition in explaining the formation of alliances. This chapter 
empirically supports these missing determinants significantly impact the formation of 
alliances especially at different types of alliances such as exploitive and explorative 
alliances. Exceptionally, however, the basic limits in the number of alliance to manage 
does not significantly impact the total number of alliance formation.  
The fourth chapter of this dissertation, the third essay, examines a firm’s risk 
preference with regard to its choice of risk alliances. Based on prospect theory and 
behavioral theory, this chapter aims to resolve the research question of why firms form 
risky alliances when such alliances yield low returns. According to risk preference 
research, a firm is a risk seeker when its returns fall below a reference point and 
conversely becomes risk averse when its returns rise above this reference point. This 
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 During the last two to three decades, the field of strategic management has been 
highly developed in the growth of theoretical and empirical research “in the study of 
business and organizations” (Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan, & Yiu, 1999: 418). However, some 
dominant but recently developed views in the field of strategic management face several 
shortcomings that require further theoretical and empirical research. Specifically, this 
dissertation seeks to address the shortcomings of Resource Based View (RBV) regarding 
the origins and processes of value creation, in alliance management capability (AMC) 
research in regards to the determinants of alliance formation, and lastly traditional 
portfolio theory approach in regards to explaining risk preference in alliance formation.    
 The first essay of this dissertation is related to resolving shortcomings on the 
Resource Based View (RBV) which has been a dominant perspective in strategic 
management. The focus of the RBV is explaining a firm’s value through an emphasis on 
the ‘the resources’ of the firm. The RBV attributes a firm’s performance to the value (V), 
rareness (R) and Inimitability (I) traits of a firm’s resources. Firms with V and R 
resources are argued to be a source of competitive advantage while firms with V, R and I 
resources are argued to sustain the firm’s competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Priem & 




This dissertation follows the style of Academy of Management Review. 
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firm. Hence, the RBV does not provide a firm level explanation of value. Furthermore, 
attributing a firm’s value to external markets is problematic because value is subject to 
evolutionary processes to which has been largely ignored by the static orientation of the 
RBV. Thereby, the RBV has been criticized for the lack of explanations on the origin of 
value and the process of value creation because RBV researchers have assumed that the 
value originates from outside of a firm and a firm’s external market is constant (Priem & 
Butler, 2001a; Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). Furthermore, internal value process within 
a firm has remained as a ‘black box’ (Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). In addition, even 
though in a market there are dynamic interactions among stakeholders- consumers, firm 
and suppliers- that impact a firm’s value creation process, the RBV has not considered 
these stakeholder interactions. Hence, the objective of the first essay of this dissertation 
is to address such shortcomings of the RBV regarding the origin and process of value 
creation. Specifically, this essay develops a theoretical model of value creation that not 
only accommodates a multi-stakeholder approach to value creation (supplier, firm and 
consumer), but as consequence yield co-evolutionary interactions to explaining dynamic 
sources of value creation to the RBV. 
 The second essay of this dissertation is related to resolving shortcomings in 
alliance management capability (AMC) research. A basic premise of the concept of 
AMC is that firms with experiences in managing alliances are better positioned to 
leverage their past experiences in managing future alliances and thus suggesting that a 
firm’s AMC positively influences a firm’s formation of alliances. Although AMC 
provides insight to explaining the formation of alliances, there are also other critical 
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factors- the number of alliance a firm could / should manage, absorptive capacity and 
competition- that are missing in AMC explanations. Furthermore, the AMC explanation 
does not consider the effects of these factors on the formation of different types of 
alliance. Although there are many possible classifications of alliances in high technology 
sectors, such as biotechnology, alliances vary in their risk-return relationship. Such risk-
return relationships are reflected by exploitation – low risk, low return- and exploration 
–high risk, high return- alliances. Hence, the objective of the second essay of this 
dissertation is to further advance understanding of not only the determinants of the 
formation of a firm’s overall number of alliances, but also the formation of these specific 
forms of alliances: exploitation / exploration alliances. In explaining the formation of 
these alliances, this study develops a theoretical and empirical examination of an AMC 
explanation that is augmented with diminishing return effects, absorptive capacity and 
competition arguments. 
 The third essay of this dissertation is related to resolving shortcomings in 
traditional risk preference approach regarding alliance formation. The traditional risk 
preference approach that is based on financial portfolio theory does not fit the empirical 
phenomenon in alliance formation. That is, evidence appears to suggest that unlike the 
predictions of financial portfolio theory, a firm’s decision to invest into an alliance is not 
based on a positive risk-return framework. Evidence suggests that firms form risky 
alliances with low return. For instance, in a pharmaceutical industry the rate of an 
approved drug of a high risk alliance was reported as 14% while that of a low risk 
alliance was 26% (Lerner, Shane, & Tsai, 2003; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006). This 
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seems to be the case of the ‘risk/return’ paradox that challenged the traditional financial 
portfolio theory (Fiegenbaum, Hart, & Schendel, 1996). Hence, the objective of the third 
essay of this dissertation is to provide an alternative explanation to the risk/return 
paradox in alliance formation. Specifically, this essay seeks to examine a firms 
preference for risky or high risk alliances by drawing on prospect theory and related 
behavioral theory to resolve the research question of why firms form risky alliances with 
low returns.   
 In organizing this dissertation, these three essays are discussed in Chapter II, 
Chapter III, and Chapter IV respectively. Overall summary and suggestions for further 
research are discussed in Chapter V.      
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 CHAPTER II 
DYNAMIC VALUE CHANGE PERSPECTIVE  
INTO RESOURCE BASED VIEW  
  
INTRODUCTION 
A basic assertion of the resource based view (RBV) is that it assumes resources 
are “valuable” (Barney, 1991; Priem & Butler 2001a; Rumelt, 1984). However, RBV 
has not clearly answered the question of what the origin and process of the value is? 
Despite the significant influence of the RBV to management research, there remains 
considerable debate on the sources or causes of such value (Bowman & Ambrosini, 
2001; Lepak, Smith, & Taylor, 2007; Priem, 2007; Priem & Butler, 2001a). For instance, 
debate between Priem and Butler (2001a, b) and Barney (2001) suggested that the value 
of a firm’s resources stems from “outside of a firm” whereby according to Priem (2007) 
such value is determined by the consumer. Thus, Priem (2007) argues that the RBV 
needs a greater attention to such sources of value. Yet sources of value also stem beyond 
that of the customer. This is because, and especially in the context of an agricultural 
value chain, value is the result of the combination of multiple technologies or resources 
that are not possessed by any one firm in their entirety. In other words, a firm’s supplier 
of rare inputs can also contribute to a firm’s value. Hence, a limitation of the RBV is it 
not only fails to sufficiently consider value from a consumer perspective –as has been 
argued by Priem (2007) but also the interactions among stakeholders of the value chain 
(e.g. Peteraf & Barney, 2003: 313).  
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Furthermore, the RBV (Barney, 1991) has been criticized for its largely static 
explanation of value and as a consequence is unable to provide process view of value 
creation (Priem and Butler, 2001a). Yet earlier developments of the RBV have attributed 
value to a firm’s internal growth process (Barney & Arikan, 2001). For instance, Penrose 
(1959) argued that value stems from an internal growth process in which a firm’s value 
stems from “the way resources are accessed and used” (Moran & Ghoshal, 1999: 391). 
Penrose attributes value to an internal processes of discovering the varied and untapped 
uses of a firm’s resources (Kor and Mahoney, 2000; Ng, 2007). Hence, although value 
creation is ultimately tied to a firm’s ability to respond to consumers’ need, especially as 
prescribed by more recent extensions of the RBV (i.e., Priem), such extended 
explanation about the sources of value is incomplete. This is because RBV explanations 
not only fail to consider the value contributed by a firm’s suppliers whose outputs are 
necessary for the creation of products to satisfy the needs of its consumers, but also for a 
firm’s internal growth process (i.e., Penrose). Such a depiction underscores that value 
stems from a dynamic or co-evolutionary process that arises from interactions between 
the supplier, firm and the consumer. However, because RBV treats value in highly static 
terms (e.g., Peteraf & Barney, 2003), such a dynamic or co-evolutionary explanations of 
firm value creation remain largely unspecified.  
As a result, the objective of this study is to develop a theoretical model of firm 
value creation that not only accommodates this multi-stakeholder approach to explaining 
the creation of a firm’s value, but also as a consequence of this multi-stake holder 
approach yields a co-evolutionary view of firm value creation. Specifically, this study 
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argues this dynamic process is attributed to bounded rationality and to the resource 
constraints of stakeholders. This is because since bounded rationality yields a trial and 
error experimentation process, a model based on bounded rationality thereby cannot 
yield a static equilibrium outcome. As a result, this study argues the stakeholders are not 
only boundedly rational (Simon, 1982), but as a consequence yield a process of value 
creation that is inherently dynamic. Furthermore, stakeholders’ behaviors are not only 
constrained by the cognitive limits imposed by bounded rationality, but the stakeholders’ 
behaviors are also influenced by their resource constraints. These resource constraints 
enhance the dynamic interactions among the stakeholders because they seek to address 
their resource constraints and firms can create value through addressing its own and 
other stakeholders’ resource constraints.    
To elaborate, in explaining the value creation process bounded rationality and 
resource constraints underlie the concepts of cognitive gap and operational gap 
respectively (Lavie, 2006). In drawing on Lavie’s ideas of a cognitive and operational 
gap, these gaps refer to two distinct sources of value creation. A cognitive gap attributes 
value from the development and discovery of potential products / services through 
discovering or diversifying untapped uses of a firm’s input resources. Operational gap 
attributes value from the improvement of a firm’s inability to fully utilize its current 
productive capacity. Yet, as a firm’s value is influenced by its stakeholders, the firm 
creates value also from recognizing and exploiting the cognitive and operational gaps of 
other stakeholders-consumers and suppliers. This is because the cognitive and 
operational gaps among the stakeholders in a market provide external opportunities for 
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firms that seek to recognize and utilize such gaps. In that, due to differences in the 
stakeholders’ positions in the value chain, each stakeholder faces boundedly rational 
behaviors that are specific to their segment of the value chain and also faces unique 
resource constraints. As stakeholders hold different cognitive and operational gaps, a 
firm’s value creation stems from exploiting such asymmetries. Value is thereby the 
result of a firm’s ability to exploit the asymmetries amongst its stakeholder groups.  
However, such value provides incentives for competition. Competition involves 
the recognition and exploitation by a firm’s rivals of the cognitive and operational gaps 
of the value chain system. That is, a firm’s rivals also seek to recognize and exploit the 
cognitive and operational gaps of the value chain system for their own value creation. 
This is in a sense different from neo-classical economics approach in which competition 
has been traditionally approached in terms of price or quantity. In this study, however, 
competition is approached in a more fundamental sense because the competition 
involves the gaps which are sources of a firm’s value creation. Because the sources of a 
firm’s value creation erode with competition, that is, the stakeholders’ cognitive and 
operational gaps erode with competition, competition creates a crisis for the firm to seek 
new sources of value creation in which new paths of resource development arise.  
To develop this line of reasoning, a firm’s ability to recognize, develop, and 
create opportunities for value creation is critical to this co-evolutionary view of value 
creation (e.g. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Peteraf & Barney, 
2003; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Venkataraman & Sarasvathy, 2001). Since value is 
created in a co-evolutionary process, changes in such value are influenced by a firm’s 
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ability to recognize, exploit, and create such value. This study attributes this process of 
value creation to a firm’s “internal resources mechanism” (IRM) which serves to 
recognize, exploit, and create a firm’s own cognitive and operational gaps as well as its 
stakeholders’ gaps. This IRM is rooted in the modern resources based concepts of 
absorptive capacity and dynamic capability. Absorptive capacity serves to “evaluate, 
assimilate, and apply new knowledge” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). While, dynamic 
capability enables the “reconfiguration” of a firm’s resources to match and even create 
changes in the market (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). 
These factors – absorptive capacity and dynamic capability that comprise a firm’s IRM 
are argued to play critical roles in the co-evolutionary process of value creation because 
they serves in the recognition, exploitation, and even creation of the firm’s own 
cognitive and operational gap as well as other stakeholders’ cognitive and operational 
gap. However, as such cognitive and operational gaps are also sources of value for a 
firm’s rivals, competition for such gaps encourages a firm’s IRM to seek new path 
creating behaviors that involve a fundamental departure from a firm’s established areas 
of competence (i.e. path creating). 
In organizing this study, this study’s unit of analysis, assumptions, and 
definitions are first stated. The conceptual foundations of this study’s arguments are then 
developed. In particular, the bounded rationality and resource constraints of value chain 
stakeholders –supplier, firm and consumer - are explained in terms of their respective 
cognitive gap and operational gaps. These gaps are used to explain the dynamic behavior 
of the market. Yet because value is created through a co-evolution between that of the 
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stakeholders and the firm’s internal resources mechanism (IRM), we then examine how 
a firm’s IRM responds to the cognitive and operational gap of its stakeholders. Testable 
propositions are also stated from this IRM approach to value creation. The study 




Unit of Analysis: A Firm 
As the objective of this study is to explain the determinants and processes of a 
firm’s value creation, this study’s unit of analysis is based at the firm level. In particular, 
although the RBV typically attributes “value” to the external market environment, this 
study examines “value” from the perspective of a firm in its relationship to stakeholders 
of its value chain. Specifically, although value stems from the relationships that a firm 
has with stakeholders in the firm’s value chain, i.e., a firm vs. consumer, and a firm vs. 
supplier, such sources of value is ultimately perceived from the  point of view of a firm. 
This approach to value is also important in certain industries such as agribusiness 
(Woolverton, Cramer, Hammonds, 1985) because value creation is the result of multiple 
stakeholders. However, this study maintains the firm level focus of the RBV because, 
the internal growth processes of the firm – as discussed later by a firm’s IRM- influence 
a firm’s perceptions of value – cognitive and operational gap- amongst its stakeholders. 
As a result, the development of our theoretical arguments about the co-evolutionary 
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relations between a firm’s internal growth and its stakeholders is taken from the point of 
view of the firm. 
 
Assumptions: Bounded Rationality  
Unlike the perfectly rational behaviors of economic man, the behaviors of 
stakeholders – consumer, firm and supplier- are predicated on the assumption of 
bounded rationality. Bounded rationality is a basic and implicit assumption of strategic 
management research (e.g., Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1994). Simon (1982) contends 
individual agents are boundedly rational because there are not only basic limits in the 
agent’s knowledge, but also cognitive limits in their ability to process information. In 
particular, a key distinction in this study’s use of the concept of bounded rationality is it 
underscores that although stakeholders do not “optimize” in a perfectly rational 
economic sense, they “attempt” to seek solutions towards a global objective or true 
optimal. Specifically this study assumes the existence of an objective reality to which 
there is an optimal solution. Yet, due to bounded rationality, such an optimal can not be 
recognized or reached instantaneously by the stakeholders. It is important to note that 
this assumption of bounded rationality is not identical with ‘constrained optimization’ of 
neo-classical economics. This is because bounded rationality is basically related to 
limitations in cognitive ability and knowledge of a decision maker while the constrained 
optimization in neo-classical economics assumes that decision makers perfectly know 
what the optimal decision is given constraints on their resources. The bounded 
rationality is well described by ‘cognitive gap’ and ‘operational gap’ suggested by Lavie 
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(2006) because boundedly rational behaviors and resource constraints are argued to 
contribute to cognitive gap and operational gap. Further explanations about the cognitive 
and operational gaps are discussed in the following section.  
 
Conceptual Developments: Cognitive Gap  
To elaborate on these concepts, Lavie defined the concept of cognitive gap as the 
differences “between the actual value-maximizing capability configuration and the 
perceived value-maximizing capability configuration” (Lavie, 2006: 166). Cognitive gap 
represents the gap between the true / objective optimum and the currently perceived 
optimum. In the context of a value chain system, this study argues that stakeholders are 
subject to such forms of cognitive gaps. This cognitive gap arises because since 
stakeholders’ cognitive ability and knowledge are limited, they do not have full 
knowledge of the available set of choices. As a result, stakeholders make decisions based 
on their given knowledge set to which yield a perceived optimum that departs from an 
objective optimum.  
To explain, consumers tend to place a value or utility on a firm’s products / 
services based on their experiences with the products / services. Hence, consumer will 
tend to choose and value a firm’s products / services in ways that maximize their utility 
given such experiences. However, because a consumer’s cognitive ability is imperfect 
there is other knowledge or information which is not processed within their given 
experiences (Hayek, 1945; Simon, 1982). Thus, although consumers appear to be 
optimizing their consumption of products, such optimizing behaviors are based on 
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incomplete knowledge experiences and thereby their choices and resulting valuations 
reflect a perceived optimum. Such a perceived optimum deviates from an objective or 
true optimum because there are other experiences not accounted for by the consumers. 
There is in a sense an objective or global optimum that reflects valuations of a firm’s 
products / services based on a broader set of knowledge experiences that has not been 
known by the consumers. The consumer’s untapped needs are likely to be included in 
the broader set of experience. Thus, due to limits on consumer’s knowledge or cognitive 
ability in gaining understanding of these other experiences, the consumer faces a 
“cognitive gap” which reflects the consumer’s untapped need and unrecognized uses and 
values of a firm’s products / services.  
Similarly due to bounded rationality, the firm is also subject to a cognitive gap. 
The cognitive gap of the firm arises from the firm’s inability to fully utilize the untapped 
product uses (i.e. new products and services) of a firm’s resources. The untapped uses of 
a firm’s resources exist because due to bounded rationality there are heterogeneous uses 
or applications of firm resources that are not fully comprehended by the firm. Namely, a 
firm’s resources are heterogeneous not only in terms of their physical attributes, but also 
in their applied uses (e.g., Penrose, 1959; Ng, 2007). Yet, although a firm’s resources 
can be applied in different ways to yield different products and services, the ways in 
which such a resource can be used is limited by the knowledge experiences of the firm 
(Penrose, 1959). Hence, similar to the consumer explanations, the firm chooses a set of 
resources that yield a perceived optimum that deviates from an objective or true 
optimum because there are other experiences not accounted for by the firm. That is, 
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there is an objective or global optimum that reflects valuations of a firm’s heterogeneous 
uses of resources that is based on a broader set of knowledge experiences that is not 
known by firm. Hence, due to limits on rationality, a firm does not have full knowledge 
of the varied possible uses of its resources, the firm faces a cognitive gap in regards to 
realizing the untapped or potential products / services that can be rendered from their 
heterogeneous resources.  
With respect to the supplier’s cognitive gap, it reflects a basic discrepancy 
between perceived use of its output and the output’s optimal. The supplier does not 
comprehend all alternative use for the demand of its product1. In essence, the supplier’s 
cognitive gap reflects discrepancies between the supplier’s perceived demand for its 
products and that of an objective demand. Such discrepancies arise because since the 
outputs produced by the supplying firm are but only one of many possible inputs used by 
the purchasing firm, the supplier does not know the synergistic relationships between its 
output and the buying firm’s use of other resources (Barney, 1986). As the purchasing 
firm possess knowledge about how its resources can be combined in ways that cannot be 
known by the supplying firm, the supplying firm thereby has limited knowledge of the 
varied use of its products. Therefore, due to bounded rationality, the supplier faces a 
cognitive gap in which it produces products for a purchasing firm that does not fully  
 
                                                 
1
 Because the supplier is mostly a firm to produce its output the logic applied to a firm for its cognitive gap 
is also applicable to the suppliers. Yet, we do not do so because since the firm is the primary unit of 
analysis, the firm’s perceptions –due to limits on bounded rationality- constrains the scope of the analysis 
to the output aspects of the supplier’s choices. In other words, due to limits on bounded rationality, the 
firm can only provide attention to the demands for its product from consumers as well as the firm’s 
resource demands it places on its supplier’s output. The supplier’s own input (resource) choices are 
beyond the scope of the firm decisions.  
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account for the varied potential uses that are desired by the purchasing firm. 
 
Operational Gap 
Unlike the concept of a cognitive gap, an operational gap arises when the firm 
and stakeholders have difficulties in reaching their perceived optimum. Firm and 
stakeholders face difficulties in reaching this perceived optimum because of a lack of 
resources or geographic constraints. The discrepancy between a perceived optimum and 
a stakeholder’s current productive state or capacity is described by the concept of 
operational gap. For instance, consumers face budget or geographical constraints in 
consuming the products / services that satisfy their perceived utility. In other words, 
there occurs the discrepancy between the consumer’s perceived optimum and his / her 
capacity due to budget or geographic constraints. The operational gap is also affected by 
change in cognitive gap because a consumer’s perceived utility is varied by change in 
his / her cognitive gap, such as discovering his / her untapped need. A new product / 
service enables a consumer to recognize his / her untapped need or utility and as a result 
increase his / her perceived optimum. Yet, because the new product / service tends to be 
expensive or limited in distribution at the beginning, it increases the consumer’s 
operational gap.  
With respect to a firm’s operational gap, its current resource configuration may 
not be sufficient to reaching its perceived optimum scale and scope because of a lack of 
complementary resources and capabilities (Lavie, 2006; Penrose, 1959). A firm’s 
operational gap is also affected by change in its cognitive gap because the firm’s 
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perceived optimum of its resource use is varied by change in the cognitive gap, such as 
introduction of a new innovative technology. The new innovative technology may 
enable the firm to recognize its untapped use of existing resources and capabilities and 
as a result increase its perceived optimum in configuration of its resources and 
capabilities. However, the new technology also increases the need of complementary 
resources and capabilities to enable its new perceived optimum to be embodied. In other 
words, the new configuration of the firm’s resources to reach the new perceived 
optimum may increase the need for complementary resources. 
While, the operational gap of the supplier is the discrepancy between the 
perceived use of its output (i.e. scale and scope) and the supplier’s productive capacity. 
The operational gap of the supplier occurs because the supplier does not have access to 
resources that enable it to fully utilize its productive capacity in ways that allow it to 
operate at its perceived optimum. However, because this study is based on firm level 
analysis, this study does not focus on the supplier’s input resource constraints in 
reaching its perceived optimum but on the discrepancy of the supplier’s output from its 
perceived optimum. The supplier’s perceived optimum is rather recognized by a 
purchasing firm’s demand. As a result, the supplier’s operational gap is also changed by 
the change in the purchasing firm’s demand. In other words, when a (purchasing) firm’s 
demand is changed, the supplier faces difficulties adjusting to it instantaneously because 




Sources of Firm Value  
From a firm’s relationship with consumers in its value chain. The firm 
exploits the consumers’ cognitive gap by developing novel products and services to meet 
the untapped needs of its consumers. In that, through the firm’s product /service 
introductions, value is rewarded to the firm for having discovered needs previously 
unknown to the consumers. For instance, upgrading the quality of the products by adding 
new features or functions, removing some features, and advertising the new products and 
services are ways in which a firm can uncover the unrealized preferences of consumers 
and thus provide a means to exploit their cognitive gaps. Hence, unlike the rationality 
assumption of neoclassical economics, consumers’ preferences are not fully defined nor 
fully known by the consumer. Rather, such preferences are informed and discovered by 
the innovative efforts of the firms (Carpenter & Nakamoto, 1989). The firm can also 
exploit a consumers’ operational gap by providing products and services in which the 
budget constraints or geographic constraints of the consumers are taken into account. 
This would involve, for instance, products with more attractive price points and / or 
expansions in transportation and distribution logistics, such as utilization of a firm’s 
established distribution channel or an alliance with a better distribution company. Hence, 
relative to cognitive gaps, the exploitation of operational gaps involves relatively less 
innovative developments in products features. The exploitation of operational gaps is not 
on revealing untapped consumer preferences but rather to reveal product features that 
relieve the constraints of the consumer. As a result, consumers’ cognitive and 
operational gaps are a source of value for the firm because it provides opportunities for 
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the firm to develop ‘novel’ products and services that meet the untapped needs of the 
consumer and also to develop ‘appropriate’ products that meet the budget and 
geographical constraints of its consumer (Lepak et al., 2007).  
From a firm’s relationship with suppliers in its value chain. Given the 
cognitive and operational gaps of suppliers, exploitation of these gaps by the firm offers 
another source of firm value. Value stems from the firm’s ability to exploits the 
cognitive and operational gaps of its suppliers through asymmetric information 
advantages. The firm is able to exploit the cognitive gaps of its suppliers because the 
firm has better knowledge about the various ways in which the supplier’s products can 
be used than the supplier. This is because unlike the supplier, the firm combines the 
outputs of the supplier with the firm’s current other resources to which provides the firm 
access to synergy effects that cannot be known by a single supplier (Barney 1986; 
Lippman & Rumelt, 2003b). Thus, knowledge of the potential as well as existing 
synergies between the various resources of a firm provides the firm an asymmetric 
information advantage that enables the firm to discover untapped uses that are not 
previously known by its supplier. Hence, by exploiting such asymmetric knowledge 
advantages, the firm can thus exploit the cognitive gaps of its supplier. In particular, this 
asymmetric information advantage in exploiting the supplier’s cognitive gap provides 
the firm greater bargaining power over its supplier. This is because a firm can develop 
new demands on the output of the supplier based on the new use of the supplier’s 
product. A firm’s new demand on the use of the supplier’s output also increases the 
supplier’s operational gap because the supplier can not respond instantaneously to the 
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new demand of its output. The firm exploits the supplier’s operational gap through 
sharing certain technology with the supplier because the exploitation of the supplier’s 
operational gap rewards the firm with better or more appropriate outputs of the supplier 
that are used as the firm’s resources for its products / services.  
From a firm’s internal cognitive gap and operational gap. The RBV has been 
criticized for its lack of attention to the causes of value and the RBV researchers have 
assumed that the value comes from outside of a firm (Priem & Butler, 2001a; Sirmon et 
al., 2007). However, the sources of value are not exclusive to the conditions of a firm’s 
external environment. A firm’s value also stems from its internal cognitive and 
operational gaps because a firm is also boundedly rational and faces resource constraints. 
As a firm recognizes and exploits its own cognitive gap and operational gap, economic 
value will be rewarded to the firm. Specifically, as a firm’s cognitive gap in which 
heterogeneous uses or applications of firm resources are not fully comprehended by the 
firm is recognized and exploited, a firm’s resources can be applied in different ways to 
yield different products and services. That is, a firm is better able to utilize the untapped 
product uses (i.e. new products and services) of a firm’s resources through recognition 
and exploitation of its cognitive gap. The firm value is also increased through 
exploitation of the firm’s operational gap. Efficiency enhancement in resource 
configuration to produce certain products /services can save a firm’s production cost. 
Furthermore, the recognition and exploitation of the firm’s operational gap is easier than 
those of its cognitive gap because the firm’s prior experience has learning effect on the 
recognition and exploitation on the operational gap. For instance, due to knowledge 
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accumulation through experience the efficiency enhancement in resource configuration 
for a certain product is easier than the invention or discovery of a new product / service.  
In sum, as the firm seeks to exploit not only its internal cognitive and operational 
gaps, but also that of its consumers and suppliers, the exploitation of these cognitive and 
operational gaps serves to provide a firm’s source of value. The following is thus 
proposed: 
Proposition 1: The cognitive and operational gaps of a firm and its stakeholders 
in a value chain – consumer and supplier- are positively related to opportunities for a 




Exploitation of Opportunities from Competition 
However, since stakeholders’ cognitive and operational gaps are a source of 
value (proposition 1), these gaps provide incentives for competition. As competitors seek 
to exploit the cognitive and operational gaps of the stakeholders, the reductions in such 
gaps impact the firm’s relationships with its stakeholders. The influence of such 
competition on a firm’s stakeholder relationships are discussed in the following.     
From a firm’s relationship with its consumers. A firm’s ability to recognize 
and exploit the cognitive and operational gaps of its consumers declines with increasing 
competitions. Namely, when a firm exploits the consumers’ cognitive gap and 
operational gap, the opportunities associated with such exploitive efforts induces 
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competition, such as entry by a firm’s rivals, to satisfy the untapped needs (cognitive 
gap) and untapped efficiencies of the consumers (operational gap). For instance, 
Starbucks, a dominant coffeehouse chain, has been increasingly challenged by new 
competitors such as McDonald’s (Pressman, 2007). During this competition, certain 
information about the consumer’s preferences for coffee, such as preferences for high 
quality traits involving coffee blends and service traits become increasingly revealed 
through the rivals’ competitive offerings. As a result, such competition not only serves to 
reveal new product and service attributes but as a consequence serve to further exploit 
consumer’s cognitive gap. Thus as competition amongst rival firms becomes intense, 
rival firms operate on increasingly similar information about the untapped needs of the 
consumers and thus leading to a reduction of the consumers’ cognitive gaps. This is 
evidenced by the development of similar products and services among rival firms as in 
fast food or coffee industry.  
Competition not only reduces consumers’ cognitive gap, but can also reduce the 
consumers’ operational gap. Competition promotes efficient production methods and 
distribution systems to which result in decreased market prices and greater product 
availability. Competition thereby reduces a consumer’s operational gap by satisfying the 
consumer’s budget and or geographical constraints. Furthermore, as more alternatives 
are offered by the competitors, the operational gap of consumers further declines. That is, 
a greater affordability and availability of products / services due to competition relax 
budget and geographical constraints of the consumer. Hence, competition increases 
exploitation of consumers’ operational gap. 
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From a firm’s relationship with suppliers. Competition by the firm’s rivals can 
also reduces the cognitive and operational gaps of a firm’s suppliers. Although a firm 
has an asymmetric knowledge advantage over the varied and thus potential uses of its 
supplier’s output products, competition serves to reveal a greater set of potential and 
untapped uses that cannot be known by the individual firm. Namely, in the aggregate, 
competitors possess greater knowledge about the varied uses of a supplier’s outputs than 
can be known by the single firm. Hence, as competition provides new ways to utilize the 
outputs of the supplying firm, this competition reduces the supplier’s cognitive gap. As a 
consequence competition mitigates the asymmetric knowledge advantages of the firm 
and thereby reducing the firm’s influence on the products of the supplier. That is, the 
influence of the firm on the demand of the supplier’s product is gradually decreased due 
to the competition. Competition also serves to reduce the suppliers’ operational gap. 
New uses for a supplier product are revealed through the competitive process and thus 
increases in the supplier knowledge about the use of its output will improve its 
productive capacity. 
In sum, although cognitive and operational gaps of stakeholders are sources of a 
firm’s value, competition, however, erodes the cognitive and operational gaps of its 
stakeholders. The reduced opportunities either favors an exit of firms from the market, or 
places increasing pressures for existing firms to create new sources of value (Astley, 
1985; Kim, 1998). The creation of new sources of value involves a fundamental 
broadening or enlarging stakeholders’ cognitive gap and operational gap. This arises 
through a process of value creation through innovation. Although innovation is 
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commonly associated with the creative efforts of the individual firm, this study, however, 
argues that the process of value creation involves interactions between the firm and its 
various stakeholders. These firm-stakeholder interactions are explained in the following. 
 
Value Creation through Innovation 
A firm’s relationship with its consumers. As competition reduces the cognitive 
and operational gaps of a firm’s stakeholder groups, the firm is more likely to undertake 
‘value creating behaviors’ that extend beyond the recognition and exploitation of the 
stakeholders’ existing cognitive and operational gaps. Innovation is central to the value 
creating behaviors. As innovations introduce new needs that are not previously 
recognized or even understood by consumers (e.g., Starbucks, IPODs), a firm’s 
innovation increases the consumers’ cognitive gap. Innovations increase the consumer’s 
cognitive gap through increases in their true optimum by shaping or forging new demand 
preferences that were not previously known by the consumer, such as in the case with 
Starbucks.  
Increases in cognitive gap can also lead to increases in operational gap because 
innovations not only increase the true optimum but also through the consumption of such 
novel products, the acquisition of new experiences increases the consumer’s perceived 
optimum. Hence, the difference between the new perceived optimum and the consumer’s 
current consumption state also increases. That is, because new innovative products / 
services are typically sold at a premium, a consumer’s current budget or geographical 
constraint precludes the consumer from the purchase of these products.  The consumer’s 
 24 
operational gap is thereby increased with innovation. For instance, Apple’s introduction 
of innovative products such as IPODS and MacBook not only revealed radically new 
products that expanded the consumer choice set and thus true optimum, but because of 
their premium pricing, these products increased the consumer’s operational gap.    
A firm’s relationship with suppliers. The creation of cognitive gap and 
operational gap through innovation also arise to the firm-suppliers interface. As 
competition reveals new valued uses for a supplier’s output, decline in the firm’s 
bargaining power over its suppliers induces a greater attention to the discovery of new 
combinations of complementary resources that yield new or unintended uses not 
previously envisioned by the supplier. This can involve the formation of strategic 
alliances that support the discovery of new resource combinations and synergies (e.g., 
Das & Teng, 2000; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). For instance, pharmaceutical 
firms have been found to form R&D alliances with start-up biotech firms so as to 
support the discovery of new configurations of resources and capabilities to which 
increases the likelihood of discovering the new and untapped resources use for the firm. 
Because alliances are more commonly formed among partners with similar experiences, 
the supplier firm is not able to access those alliances formed by the purchasing firm. As 
a result, it is difficult for suppliers to recognize those resource combinations and 
synergies that are discovered by the firm. Hence, through the firm’s discovery of new 
resource combinations, such as through the formation of alliances, this discovery 
increases the suppliers’ cognitive gap to which increases the firm’s bargaining power 
over its suppliers. With respect to the supplier’ operational gap, it is increased by 
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innovation because as a firm’s innovations create new input demands, such demands 
involve the differentiation of the supplier’s product, such as upgrading quality of the 
existing outputs of the supplier. The adaptation to the new demand may require the 
supplier to improve or change their current productive capacity. The supplier may need 
to make more investment in facilities and human capitals to improve or change its 
current productive capacity. Thereby its operational gap is enlarged by the innovation.  
These arguments, thereby, suggest that although innovation is central to the 
creation of firm value, innovation is however induced by competition. Namely, 
competition has two effects to the value process. Competition serves to not only erode 
the stakeholders’ cognitive and operational gaps and thus reducing a firm’s value but 
such declines serves to induce the discovery of new sources of value. That is, 
competition creates a crisis that induces a firm to innovate new sources of cognitive and 
operational gaps to its various stakeholders. Such innovation entails a distinct departure 
from a firm’s past experiences (Kim & Mauborgne, 1997). For instance, Kim (1998) 
argued that Hyundai Motor, a Korean car maker, intentionally evoked an internal crisis 
to reshape itself. In other words, due to pressures from competition, the firm created a 
new path involving the deployment of resources in an innovative manner, which is 
necessary to create value among stakeholders through increase in their cognitive gap and 
operational gap. As result of these stakeholder interactions, a firm’s value undergoes a 
dynamic process proposed by the following. 
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Proposition 2: A firm’s value – as attributed to the cognitive gaps and 
operational gaps of the market system – is non-monotonically (U shape) related to a 
firm’s competition.  
As the RBV has been criticized for its lack of attention to explaining the causes 
and process of value, the aforementioned discussions serve to rectify these limitations. 
However, the sources of firm value and processes of the value creation are not exclusive 
to the conditions of a firm’s external environment. A firm’s value creation is affected by 
its ability to discover and exploit its internal cognitive and operational gaps. Specifically, 
this study argues in the following discussions that a firm has internal resources 
mechanism (IRM) that serve to not only exploit its internal cognitive and operational 
gaps, but this IRM also coevolves with the cognitive and operational gaps of its 
stakeholders (e.g., Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000; Levinthal & Myatt, 1994). Thereby to 
complete our argument of the value process we need to investigate the relationship 
between the value process of the market and a firm’s internal resources mechanism 
(IRM). To explain this relationship, the firm’s ‘internal resources mechanism (IRM)’ is 
first outlined and then its relationship to the stakeholders’ cognitive and operational gaps 




























































































































































































































































































































































INTERNAL RESOURCES MECHANISM (IRM) 
Key Components of the IRM: Absorptive Capacity and Dynamic Capability
Since value is a product of both a firm’s resources and from the market value 
process, the purpose or function of a firm’s internal resources mechanisms (IRM) –
consisting of the concepts of absorptive capacity and dynamic capability–is to recognize, 
exploit and create value opportunities from a firm’s internal and external environments. 
These concepts reflect more modern treatments of the resource based view (RBV), 
which have a distinctly dynamic orientation that focuses on the internal growth 
processes of the firm. A firm’s internal growth processes involves the recognition, 
exploitation and creation of its cognitive and operational gaps. Specifically, the function 
of a firm’s absorptive capacity and dynamic capability is to recognize, exploit, and 
create these gaps in distinct ways. 
Absorptive capacity. The function of a firm’s absorptive capacity is to 
recognize and exploit  a firm’s operational gap. The concept of absorptive capacity was 
developed by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) which  refers to a firm’s ability to evaluate 
and assimilate external knowledge for the purposes of creating commercialized products 
/ services. A key empirical finding on absorptive capacity research is that a firm’s 
cumulative experiences positively impact the firm’s ability to internalize external 
information (e.g., Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990). That is, the concept of absorptive 
capacity argues that there are non-trivial costs associated with the internalization of new 
and external information to which such costs decline with a firm’s experience. Because 
absorptive capacity tends to recognize and assimilate information that reinforces their 
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prior experiences, it promotes learning curve advantages that lead to improvements in 
the efficient uses of its existing resources. As a result, absorptive capacity is suited to 
recognizing and exploiting a firm’s operational gap. This is because a firm’s absorptive 
capacity can utilize its past experiences towards internalizing practices that leads to a 
more efficient utilization of its production activities. In that, a basic function of a firm’s 
absorptive capacity is to recognize and assimilate external knowledge that leads to a 
configuration or reconfiguration of its current state of production activities that is closer 
to its perceived optimum (Zahra & George, 2002).  
However, this commitment to reduce the operational gap mitigates the firm’s 
effort to recognize and exploit its cognitive gap because as absorptive capacity is 
committed to evaluating and assimilating related information – information that is 
similar to prior experiences, it stifles innovation. That is, even though the path dependent 
orientation of the absorptive capacity helps to reduce operational gaps (Lavie, 2006), 
improvements in operational gap leads to a commitment to established behaviors. Thus, 
a firm’s absorptive capacity is often trapped by its commitment to reduce the operational 
gap to its perceived optimum. As a consequence, although path dependency tends to 
increase organizational efficiencies and thus reduce operational gaps, it creates core 
rigidity within a firm (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Levinthal & March, 1993; Levitt & March, 
1988). Furthermore, there are incentives for a firm to recognize and exploit its 
operational gap first rather than cognitive gap. This is because relative to the cognitive 
gap, a firm’s operational gap is more readily recognized and exploited because a firm’s 
accumulated experiences can be more readily leveraged to exploit operational gaps. As 
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the recognition and exploitation of cognitive gaps involves the discovery of untapped 
and even unrelated resources, such discoveries are unlikely to be related to a firm’s past 
learning curve experiences. Hence, the exploitation of the operational gap is less risky 
and its returns are more certain than the exploitation of the cognitive gap and its return. 
Thereby, a firm’s absorptive capacity tends to favor the recognizing and exploiting of its 
operational gap over those of its cognitive gap.  
Proposition 3a: A firm’s absorptive capacity better recognizes and exploits its 
operational gap than its cognitive gap. 
However, as competition promotes an internal crisis, competition can induce 
revolutionary or “discontinuous” forms of learning (Kim, 1998). Specifically, as new 
forms of learning require an exposure to new external sources of information, 
competition induces a firm’s absorptive capacity to broaden its assimilation of 
experiences. As new information is assimilated, a firm’s absorptive capacity develops 
new ways to utilize their existing resources. During the process, a firm’s cognitive gap is 
better recognized and as a consequence, the likelihood to yield new product innovations 
increases. The new product innovations serve to thereby exploit a firm’s cognitive gap. 
Hence, competition serves to reduce the path dependent rigidities of a firm’s absorptive 
capacity to which the assimilation of new experiences serves to develop new products 
that exploit the firm’s cognitive gap.  
Dynamic capability. In addition to a firm’s absorptive capacity, a firm’s IRM 
also consists of a dynamic capability. Unlike the concept of absorptive capacity, 
dynamic capability is not focused on the evaluation and assimilation of information, but 
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is focused on changes to a firm’s resources configuration (Schreyögg & Kliesch-Eberl, 
2007). Dynamic capability underscores that a firm’s growth and survival rests on the 
reconfiguration of a firm’s resources and capabilities to the changing conditions of the 
market (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997). The reconfiguration of a firm’s 
resources and capabilities can arise in a path dependent and / or path creating fashion. 
The former reconfiguration involves incremental changes to a firm’s current resources 
configurations while the latter creates fundamental or radical changes to the resources 
configuration. These different reconfigurations impact the firm’s cognitive and 
operational gaps differently. The path dependent reconfiguration reduces a firm’s 
operational gap while the path creating reconfiguration increases both a firm’s cognitive 
and operational gaps. 
To explain, a firm’s dynamic capability is first argued to reduce a firm’s 
operational gap through path dependent changes in its resources and capabilities. This is 
because incremental change in a firm’s resources and capabilities serves to reinforce the 
firm’s core competences (Teece et al., 1997). Such incremental changes increase the 
efficiency among resources and capabilities which leads to improvement in attaining a 
firm’s perceived optimum (Lavie, 2006; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Furthermore, such 
incremental change is supported by learning curve advantage through experience. Zollo 
and Winter (2002) argued that knowledge accumulation can be used as an input for a 
firm’s dynamic capability because the assimilation of related knowledge experiences 
results in a reconfiguration of resources that is in closely proximity to a firm’s 
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established experiences. Hence, such dynamic capability leads to improvements in 
operational efficiencies to which serves to exploit gains from a firm’s operational gap.  
Proposition 3b: The path dependent function of a firm’s dynamic capability 
exploits its operational gap better than its cognitive gap. 
However, unlike the concept of absorptive capacity, dynamic capability is not 
strictly path dependent (Leonard-Barton, 1992). This is because dynamic capability 
argues that the firm’s internal change processes will match the extent of those changes in 
its external environment. For instance, when a firm faces intense competition, research 
shows that firm faces increasing pressures to deviate from their established paths (Astley, 
1985; Garud & Karnoe, 2001). Hence, this study argues that under such competitive 
conditions, a firm’s dynamic capability serves to create significant or non-incremental 
reconfigurations in the firm’s resources and capabilities. As a consequence of such path 
creating changes, dynamic capability increases a firm’s cognitive gap and operational 
gap. 
To elaborate, since a firm’s dynamic capability tends to match the conditions of 
the market, highly competitive conditions induce the firm’s dynamic capability to 
fundamentally reconfigure its resources and capabilities. This reveals new combinations 
of resource uses that are unrelated to existing configurations of resources and 
capabilities. As a consequence, the ‘non patterned and multidirectional’ paths in resource 
combinations increase the likelihood to find new resource uses which are not constrained 
by a firm’s prior knowledge of resource uses. Moreover, because the new resource uses 
are combined synergistically with other resources and capabilities, the likelihood to 
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create or discover newer resource uses also increases (Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003). 
The discovery of newer resource uses is therefore likely to increase a firm’s cognitive 
gap because the new discovered or created resource uses change the objective optimum 
of the firm’s resources configuration. The discovery of new resource uses also increases 
a firm’s perceived optimum because the firm’s current perceived optimum is reevaluated 
based on enlarged combination set with the newly discovered resource uses. However, 
despite the discovery of new resource uses the firm’s current productive capacity is not 
instantaneously upgraded because the newly discovered resource uses are not likely to fit 
to a firm’s current productive capacity without complementary resources and capabilities 
(Ng, 2007; Penrose, 1959). Thereby, this process to increase the cognitive gap through 
discovering new resource uses enhances the need for complementary resources and as a 
result increasing the operational gap. Thus, the increase in cognitive gap leads to 
increases in a firm’s operational gap. 
In addition, the knowledge of new resource uses will be utilized to create new 
products / services, which are likely to impact an established market in a Schumpeterian 
way, i.e., causing creative destruction. This follows dynamic capability research that 
argues the reconfiguration of resources in response to changes in market environment 
yields new paths of resource development even to create or shape the market 
environment (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, 2007). Thereby, a firm’s dynamic 
capability not only matches the high competition of its external market, but also creates 
or shapes the change in the external market by increasing its cognitive gap and 
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operational gap through the fundamental reconfiguration of existing resources and 
capabilities. 
Proposition 3c: Competition in a market is positively related to the path creating 
function of a firm’s dynamic capability. 
Proposition 3d: The path creating function of a firm’s dynamic capability 
increases its cognitive gap and operational gap. 
A firm’s IRM –absorptive capacity and dynamic capability- not only serves to 
exploit its internal cognitive and operational gaps, but also shapes the cognitive and 
operational gaps of other stakeholders. In other words, a firm’s internal growth process, 
as depicted by its IRM, co-evolves with the cognitive and operational gaps of its 
stakeholders. A firm’s co-evolution with its consumers’ and suppliers’ cognitive and 
operational gaps is elaborated in the following sections.  
 
A Firm’s IRM and Value Processes: Value Recognition, Exploitation and Creation 
 The primary functions of a firm’s IRM -absorptive capacity and dynamic 
capability- is to recognize, exploit and create value opportunities from its internal and 
external environment. This section examines how a firm’s absorptive capacity and 
dynamic capability distinctively influence the recognition, exploitation and creation of 
the cognitive and operational gaps of its consumers and suppliers. 
Absorptive capacity and stakeholder cognitive and operational gaps. A 
firm’s absorptive capacity basically involves the recognition and exploitation of the 
cognitive and operational gaps of its stakeholders because absorptive capacity serves to 
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evaluate and assimilate new or external information to commercially utilize it. For the 
firm-consumer interface, a firm’s absorptive capacity serves to recognize and exploit 
cognitive and operational gaps of its consumers. Because a firm’s absorptive capacity is 
path dependent, the recognition and exploitation of a consumers’ untapped need 
(cognitive gap) and budget or geographical constraints (operational gap) are constrained 
by the firm’s prior experience. That is, a firm may have difficulties in recognizing and 
exploiting the cognitive and operational gaps of consumers beyond the firm’s prior 
experience.  
Hence, a firm’s absorptive capacity favors the exploitation of the operational gap 
than that of cognitive gap of the consumer. That is, the learning curve advantage through 
leveraging prior knowledge or experiences through a firm’s absorptive capacity is larger 
at exploiting the consumers’ operational gap than their cognitive gap. The exploitation of 
consumers’ operational gap, such as satisfying their budget or geographical constraints, 
is closely related to a firm’s marketing strategies of given products and services. Prior 
marketing strategies are accumulated within a firm’s absorptive capacity and relatively 
easily utilized for other products and services. A firm’s absorptive capacity exploits the 
consumers’ operational gap through refining its prior knowledge or experience by 
assimilating related knowledge. Specifically, the firm leverages its prior knowledge 
about lowering price of products / services to meet the consumers’ budget constraints. 
The firm can also utilize its prior experience about distribution of its prior products / 
services to better mitigate the consumers’ geographical constraints. Hence, the 
leveraging of prior knowledge or experience through absorptive capacity will increase a 
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firm’s operational efficiency in its resources configurations that will lead to better 
exploitation of the consumers’ operational gap. On the contrary, the exploitation of the 
consumers’ cognitive gap, such as satiating their untapped needs, is likely to be closely 
related to development of a new product / service or a new technology that has not been 
in a firm’s learning curve. A new product / service or a new technology development 
usually takes more time and higher cost, and its outcome is more uncertain than the 
marketing strategies and their outcomes do. Thereby, there are high incentives for a firm 
to favor the exploitation of the consumers’ operational gap than that of their cognitive 
gap through leveraging prior experience through the firm’s absorptive capacity.  
Proposition 4a: A firm’s absorptive capacity better exploits the consumers’ 
operational gap than their cognitive gap. 
However, when external competition is severe, a firm faces more pressure to 
exploit the consumers’ cognitive gap because such competition promotes an internal 
crisis to which induces revolutionary changes in behavior, such as its learning (Kim, 
1998). Specifically, as new forms of learning require an exposure to new external 
sources of information, competition induces a firm’s absorptive capacity to broaden its 
assimilation of experiences. As new information is assimilated, a firm’s absorptive 
capacity develops new ways to utilize their existing resources. During the process, the 
consumers’ cognitive gap is recognized and exploited and as a result, the likelihood to 
yield new products / services is increased. The new products / services serve to exploit 
the consumers’ cognitive gap. Hence, competition serves to reduce the path dependent 
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rigidities of a firm’s absorptive capacity to which the assimilation of new experiences 
serves to develop new products that exploit the consumers’ cognitive gap.  
With respect to a firm-supplier interface, a firm’s absorptive capacity also serves 
the recognition and exploitation of the cognitive and operational gaps of its suppliers. 
Because a supplier’s output is combined with the firm’s other resources, the firm has a 
greater breadth of experiences in the use of the supplier’s output relative to the supplier. 
This is because the synergic effect between the supplier’s output and the firm’s other 
resources cannot be known by the supplier. The broader experiences on the use of the 
supplier’s output are utilized through the firm’s absorptive capacity to recognize and 
exploit the supplier’s cognitive gap. The firm exploits or reduces the supplier’s cognitive 
gap by creating new demand for the supplier’s output, such as different quality of output, 
which is not known by the supplier. However, this new demand for the supplier’s output 
is highly constrained by the firm’s prior experience or knowledge within its absorptive 
capacity.  
Unlike the exploitation of supplier’s cognitive gap, the supplier’s operational gap 
is exploited through a firm’s providing incentives or pressures for the supplier to 
improve its own productive capacity. As a firm’s knowledge about the use of the 
supplier’s output is increasingly refined through its absorptive capacity, the firm’s 
refined knowledge is more likely to be embedded in its demand on the supplier’s output. 
The firm’s more refined demand enables the supplier to better recognize its deficiency in 
its productive capacity, i.e., reason of its inability to meet the firm’s demand. This is 
likely to provide larger incentives for the supplier to improve its productive capacity to 
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meet the demand of the firm. This is the way a firm exploits its supplier’s operational 
gap through its absorptive capacity. Thereby, the supplier’s operational gap is less 
directly exploited than the supplier’s cognitive gap because the supplier’s cognitive gap 
is more closely recognized in the firm’s various combinations of resources and the 
supplier’s output. 
Proposition 4b: A firm’s absorptive capacity better exploits the suppliers’ 
cognitive gap than their operational gap. 
Dynamic capability and stakeholder cognitive and operational gaps. A firm’s 
dynamic capability causes changes in its resources configurations and as a result 
impacting the relationship with its stakeholders such as consumers and suppliers. A 
firm’s dynamic capability reconfigures its resources configurations to exploit the 
stakeholders’ cognitive and operational gaps as well as to create their new cognitive and 
operational gaps, which would be discussed later. The exploitation of the stakeholders’ 
cognitive and operational gaps is supported by incremental changes in the firm’s 
resources configurations through the firm’s path dependent function of its dynamic 
capability. This is because a firm’s dynamic capability is -to an extent- influenced by 
path dependent process (Teece et al, 1997; Zollo & Winter, 2002). That is, a firm’s 
dynamic capability is influenced by learning curve advantage such as prior experience in 
resources configuration.  
With respect to a firm-consumer interface, because a firm’s learning curve 
experiences serve to more readily recognize a consumer’s operational gap than their 
cognitive gap, incremental change through a firm’s dynamic capability serves to 
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therefore better exploit a consumers’ operational gap than their cognitive gap. Through 
refinements in a firm’s resources configurations, a firm’s dynamic capabilities serves to 
reduce the consumers’ operational gap in which incremental refinements in a firm’s 
current resources configurations, such as marketing, serves to develop products / 
services that alleviate the budget and geographical constraints of the consumer. Despite 
the increasing efficiency in the firm’s use of resources, the path dependent 
reconfiguration of a firm’s dynamic capability is, however, likely to increase core 
rigidity within the firm in its relationship with its consumers (Leonard-Barton, 1992; 
Levinthal & March, 1993; Levitt & March, 1988). Thus, because the path dependent 
function of a firm’s dynamic capability promotes the exploitation of the consumer’s 
operational gap, the consumer’s cognitive gap is less likely to be exploited through the 
path dependent function of the dynamic capability. 
Proposition 4c: A firm’s dynamic capability’s path dependent function better 
exploits the consumers’ operational gap than their cognitive gap. 
However, with respect to a firm-supplier interface, a firm’s dynamic capability 
serves better in the exploitation of its suppliers’ cognitive gap than the suppliers’ 
operational gap. This is because the suppliers’ output is utilized as resources for the 
firm’s products / services. The path dependent function of the dynamic capability 
provides incremental change to the combinations of the firm’s resources and the 
supplier’s output. Thereby, the reconfiguration of the combinations through dynamic 
capability increase the likelihood to recognize and exploit the cognitive gap of the 
suppliers’ output, the untapped uses of their output. Because the incremental change in 
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the resources configurations through the firm’s dynamic capability refines the firm’s 
knowledge about the use of the suppliers’ output, the firm’s demand to the suppliers is 
also refined. The suppliers’ cognitive gap is exploited through the firm’s refined 
demands. However, the exploitation of the suppliers’ operational gap, such as 
improvement in the suppliers’ productive capacity, is not directly sought through 
dynamic capability. The firm’s refined demand through the path dependent function of 
the dynamic capability provides incentives or pressures for the suppliers to improve their 
productive capacity to meet the refined demand. This is a way the suppliers’ operational 
gap is exploited through the firm’s dynamic capability. Though a firm does not fully 
know the productive capacity of the suppliers due to its bounded rationality, the firm has 
an indirect influence on the suppliers’ operational gap through its dynamic capability.    
However, as a firm’s external market becomes highly competitive the function of 
a firm’s dynamic capability is changed. This is because a firm’s dynamic capability is 
not only less vulnerable to path dependency but also basically changes its internal 
resources and capabilities in response to the changing conditions of its external market 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, 2007). Because the competition reduces the 
cognitive and operational gaps of the firm’s stakeholders, the enhanced competition 
provides a high pressure on a firm to create new value opportunities by creating the 
cognitive and operational gaps for its stakeholders. The creation of cognitive and 
operational gaps for a firm’s stakeholders is mainly achieved through fundamental 
reconfiguration of a firm’s existing resources and capabilities by its dynamic capability. 
Hence, as a firm’s external competition is increased its dynamic capability promotes 
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fundamental or significant changes in its resources configurations to create new 
cognitive and operational gap.  
A firm’s stakeholders’ cognitive and operational gaps are increased or created 
through the path creating function of the dynamic capability. With respect to a firm-
consumer interface, a firm seeks to create the consumers’ cognitive and operational gaps 
through ‘path creating’ innovations by its dynamic capability. A firm’s fundamental 
changes in its resources configurations through its dynamic capability create new 
combinations among resources and capabilities that lead to new innovations in products / 
services (Ng, 2007). The innovations that create or increase the consumers’ cognitive 
gap also temporarily increase the operational gap of the consumers because the new 
products embedded with the innovations are usually expensive at beginning and thereby 
cause budget constraints to some consumers. With respect to a firm-supplier interface, a 
new use of a supplier’s output is created by the fundamental change in combinations 
among the firm’s input resources and the supplier’s output through the firm’s dynamic 
capability (Lavie, 2006; Nelson & Winter, 1982). The new created or discovered uses of 
the supplier’s output are likely to create new demands on the supplier’s output. However, 
because the new demands are not met instantaneously with the supplier’s current 
productive capacity, the supplier’s operational gap is also created or increased.   
Proposition 4d: The path creating function of a firm’s dynamic capability creates 




DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This study has several contributions to the resource based view (RBV), a recent 
dominant perspective in strategic management. The lack of attention to external causes 
as well as process of value creation has been central to criticisms to the RBV (Priem & 
Butler, 2001a). To address these shortcomings of RBV, this study examined the origins 
of a firm’s value from cognitive and operational gaps of its stakeholders in its value 
chain as well as from its own internal gaps. The existence of such gaps creates an 
external dynamic that is motivated by competition and by the firm’s IRM. Such a 
dynamic involves the recognition and exploitation of these gaps. Exploitation of these 
gaps, however, induces the creation of new cognitive and operational gaps by a firm’s 
IRM. This firm-IRM and stakeholder gap interface underscores that value is a co-
evolving and co-created process. This argument extended the RBV into more dynamic 
dimension of firm value. The dynamic dimension of firm value -its recognition, 
exploitation, and creation- was examined through a firm’s internal resources mechanism 
(IRM). 
Specifically, this study incorporated the concept of a firm’s absorptive capacity 
and dynamic capability as key components of the firm’s internal resources mechanism 
(IRM). This reflects more modern treatment of the RBV which have a distinctly 
dynamic orientation and provides greater attention to the internal processes of the firm. 
However, this approach to RBV through a firm’s IRM - absorptive capacity and 
dynamic capability- is also consistent with the early motivation of the RBV. According 
to Penrose (1959) value stems from a process in which a firm’s ‘best use of resources’ is 
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developed from “the way resources are accessed and used” (Moran & Ghoshal, 1999: 
391). This study showed how the sources of value, i.e., cognitive gap and operational 
gap of stakeholder group, were recognized, exploited and even created through the 
functions of absorptive capacity and dynamic capability. Especially, due to the path 
dependency of a firm’s absorptive capacity, the consumers’ operational gap is better 
recognized and exploited than their cognitive gap. While, because a firm’s dynamic 
capability inherently provides change in its resources configuration and is also less 
vulnerable to path dependency, stakeholders’ cognitive and operational gaps are created 
through the firm’s dynamic capability.  
However, this study’s approach to value is distinct to a traditional, i.e., neo-
classical approach, such as in demand or production theory based approach. For instance, 
in demand theory, consumers’ utility or preference is assumed given or perfectly known 
to the consumers themselves. Thereby, the consumers choose a product / service that 
maximize their utility given their budget constraints. However, this study challenges the 
assumptions of the consumers’ perfect knowledge about their utility or preference. Due 
to limited cognitive ability or knowledge, the consumers’ preference is not fully known 
to the consumers but rather pioneered and shaped by a firm as argued by Carpenter and 
Nakamoto (1982). Similarly, because production theory of the neo-classical economics 
is based on perfect rationality, its production function that represents maximum output 
given inputs does not consider the producer’s limited cognitive ability. In those regards, 
the cognitive gap and operational gap approach to value may be more realistic than the 
traditional neo-classical economics because the stakeholders’ limited cognitive ability is 
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explicitly considered. Hence, the basic distinction of this study stems from different 
assumption on rationality of stakeholder groups.        
Furthermore, a firm’s external competition was also suggested as a significant 
determinant to the value process, i.e., changes in cognitive and operational gaps of the 
stakeholder group – consumer and supplier. Neo-classical economics traditionally 
viewed competition in terms of price of a firm’s input and output. However, this study 
approached competition in terms of cognitive gap and operational gap. This approach is 
more general because the gaps involve more diverse dimensions of the firm’s product 
and input resources beyond prices.  
 
Implications for Managers of a Firm  
Due to bounded rationality, value is fundamentally related to changes in the 
cognitive gap and operational gap of stakeholders. This may provide significant 
managerial implications. First, managers should evaluate their firms’ own cognitive gap 
and operational gap to recognize, exploit, and even create value. Because the recognition, 
exploitation and creation of value is contingent on the functions of absorptive capacity 
and dynamic capability, managers should understand path dependent and path creating 
aspects of absorptive capacity and dynamic capability. Because a firm’s absorptive 
capacity is largely constrained by its past experiences, and dynamic capability is 
constrained by a firm’s existing resource configuration, managers should be mindful that 
such path dependency leads to core rigidities to the firm (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Finally, 
managers should understand that the preferences of their consumers are changeable or 
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shapeable. Firms can shape the consumers’ preferences through recognizing, exploiting, 
and even creating the cognitive gap and operational gap. In addition, managers should 
understand the dynamic value change process to provide a source of renewal to their 
firms when the firms are involved in levels of competition.  
 
Implications for Future Research 
Currently this study introduces one critical limitation and as a consequence 
implication for future research. Operationalizing the cognitive gap and operational gap for 
empirical research is a big challenge because the true optimum and perceived optimum in 
the two constructs are not easy to measure in a real world. However, alternatively historical 
data such as time series or panel data which consist of various cross-section units’ time 
series data can give some proxy for the two concepts. For example, because it is likely that 
consumers’ untapped or un established need is embedded in their long term optimum, the 
cognitive gap of the consumers can be constructed through the difference between the long 
term optimum and short term optimum. The operational gap can be constructed through the 
difference between the short term optimum and consumers’ current capacity. However, 
because each individual consumer’ perceived optimum is different depending on the 
individuals, individual effect should be considered in the constructs of short term optimum 
as in longitudinal data analysis with fixed effect to consider unobservable individual effect 
(Baltagi, 2001; Hsiao, 1986). Future research can contribute through the operationalization 




      THE DETERMINANTS OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCE FORMATION IN 
   BIOTECHNOLOGY SECTOR 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Strategic alliances that involve voluntary agreements between firms to exchange, 
share, and co-develop products, technologies, or services have become an increasingly 
important subject of research inquiry among management researchers (Gulati, 1998). A 
large body of theoretical and empirical research finds strategic alliances provide benefits 
such as the acquisition of complementary resources, reduction of transaction costs, 
enhancement of a firm’s competitive position, increases in market power, and a 
reduction of risk in highly competitive markets (Barringer & Harrison, 2000; Brass, 
Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004; Gulati, 1998; Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002; 
Kogut 1988; Lavie, 2006; Moller & Svahn, 2006; Young-Ybarra & Wiersema, 1999). 
Yet although various empirical research have examined the performance implications of 
alliances (e.g. Ireland et al, 2002 for a review), with the possible exception of Alliance 
Management Capability explanations, there have been relatively limited attention given 
to the study of the causal determinants of alliance formation.  
A basic premise of the concept of AMC is that firms with experiences in 
managing alliances are better positioned to leverage their past experiences in managing 
future alliances and thus suggests a firm’s AMC positively influences a firm’s formation 
of alliances. Various studies have confirmed this explanation in which Kale, Dyer, and 
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Singh (2002) found that firms that possess an ‘alliance management capability (AMC)’ 
were more likely to form alliances and can result in a higher level of success. 
Specifically, Dyer, Kale and Singh (2001) shows that firms, such as Hewlett Packard, Eli 
Lilly and Oracle who developed a dedicated unit to the management of alliances – which 
promotes the development of experiences in managing multiple alliances- were able to 
achieve a 25% higher success rate than firms without this capability. Hence, as AMC 
improves a firm’s success with alliances, this suggests AMC positively influences the 
formation of alliances. Although such an AMC explanation offers positive developments 
in explaining the determinants of alliance formation, such an explanation faces three 
limitations.  
First, since AMC is based on a firm’s experiences in managing alliances, the 
number of alliances managed by the firm should be strongly correlated with this concept 
of AMC. Hence, in accordance to a logic of AMC, increases in the number of prior 
alliances formed should positively influence future alliances. Yet, empirical research 
finds that increasing the number of prior alliances eventually lead to diminishing return 
effects and thus suggesting limits to the formation of a firm’s alliances (Deeds & Hill, 
1996; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006). For instance, in Rothaermel and Deeds’ (2006) study 
of the biotechnology industry, they argue executives face increasing limits in their ability 
to manage multiple alliances because of limits associated with bounded rationality. As 
managers deal with a greater number of alliances, the complexity involved in managing 
such interdependencies exceeds the management’s cognitive ability to affect a successful 
outcome. Furthermore, and on a related note, bounded rationality can yield agency and 
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governance related problems that preclude a successful alignment of the various interests 
of a firm’s alliance partners. Thus, due to limits imposed by bounded rationality, 
increase in alliances formation leads to increasing agency and governance costs which 
can lead to diminishing return effects. Furthermore, Rothaermel and Deeds (2006) also 
argue the marginal benefit of forming an alliance is greater than the marginal benefits of 
subsequent alliances because the gains associated with the former are more readily 
obtained than the latter. In other words, managers tend to seek the “low hanging fruit” of 
alliances in which subsequent alliances tend to yield a diminishing return effect.  
These arguments are consistent with Rothaermel and Deeds’ (2006) empirical 
finding in which they observed a firm’s performance exhibits a diminishing return effect 
or inverted U shape effect with its number of alliances. One implication of this 
diminishing effect to the formation of firm alliances is it suggests that firms are more 
likely to form an alliance when the number of prior alliances falls below this point of 
diminishing returns. Conversely, firms are less likely to form an alliance or even reduce 
the formation of alliances when they exceed this point of diminishing returns. This 
suggests that although a firm’s AMC is strongly correlated with a firm’s cumulative 
alliances, AMC explanations, however, do not account for the role of such diminishing 
return effects on a firm’s alliance formation.  
Second, since firms form alliances to gain access to new external experiences 
(Lane & Lubatkin, 1998), a firm’s AMC does not account for “absorptive capacity” 
explanations. A basic argument underlying absorptive capacity explanations is that a 
firm’s prior experience reduces the cost of assimilating external experiences because by 
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increasing a firm’s prior experiences it increases its ability to relate to external 
experiences. Hence, despite sharing a common emphasis on a firm’s prior knowledge, 
absorptive capacity reasoning is different from alliance management capability 
explanations. With AMC, prior experiences are drawn upon to reduce the cost of 
managing future alliances through developing governance structure and routines (Kale, 
Dyer, & Singh, 2002). While, the prior experiences in absorptive capacity serve the 
purpose of assimilating external knowledge experience so as to commercialize new 
products (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). As a result, the formation of alliances are, therefore, 
not only dependent on a firm’s ability to govern future alliances –as would be argued by 
an AMC perspective, but also on a firm’s ability to assimilate external knowledge and 
commercialize new product developments.  
Third, as AMC focuses on a firm’s experiences in managing multiple alliances, 
AMC tends to understate the competitive conditions that surround the formation of 
alliances (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). As competition promotes changes in 
product and strategic factor (input) markets (Barney, 1986; Porter, 1980), firms respond 
to such competition by developing new sources of competitive advantage (Besanko, 
Dranove, Shanley, & Schaefer, 2003). Competition can thereby promote the formation 
of alliances because by gaining access to new resources and experiences, firms can 
develop new sources of competitive advantage (e.g., Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; 
Park, Chen, & Gallagher, 2002; Patzelt, Shepherd, Deeds, & Bradley, 2008; Shan, 1990). 
Namely, as competition promotes incentives to reduce costs and /or promote 
Schumpeterian like innovations, competition could positively influence the formation of 
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specific types of alliances. For instance, as competition promotes a greater focus on cost 
reduction, competition can promotes “exploitive” alliances that focus on encouraging 
existing strengths by developing partnership that reduces a firm’s operating efficiencies 
and costs. Competition can also promote “explorative” alliances that promote 
coordination of diverse partnerships to which promote innovation (e.g. Nicholls-Nixon 
& Woo, 2003; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Shan, Walker, & Kogut, 1994). Hence, as 
AMC focuses on the firm’s cumulative alliance experiences, AMC explanations not only 
fail to consider such external conditions, but also the effects of competition on the 
formation of these specific types of alliances are underdeveloped. 
 As a result, although the performance consequence of alliance has been well 
examined subject of research inquiry, the determinant of alliance formation remains a 
subject of less attention, especially in regards to the formation of exploitive and 
explorative alliances. Hence, the objective of this study is to further advance 
understanding of the determinant of alliance formation by augmenting AMC 
explanations with those of absorptive capacity, and competition so as to develop a 
theoretical model to explain not only the formation of alliances, but also the formation of 
exploitive and explorative alliances. This theoretical model is empirically tested using 
fixed effects estimation on panel data of 97 firms in the pharmaceutical industry over 
1999 to 2004. This industry was chosen because it represents a knowledge-oriented 
economy in which a firm’s internal learning and competition have been found to 
influence the formation of a firm’s alliance (Das & Teng, 2000, 2002; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Hamel, 1991; Holmqvist, 2004; Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998; 
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Koza & Lewin, 1998; Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson, & Sparks, 1998; Powell, Koput, 
& Smith-Doerr, 1996).  
 In organizing this study, this study’s unit of analysis, definitions and assumptions 
are first stated. This study’s conceptual developments follow in which the determinants 
of alliance formation – AMC, absorptive capacity, competition – on the formation of a 
firm’s alliances- including exploitation and exploration- are discussed next. Testable 
hypotheses are also developed. The next section provides a discussion of the data and a 
panel estimation method using generalized method of moment (GMM). A discussion of 
the results follows. Lastly, the study’s conclusions, implications and contribution to 




Unit of Analysis and Definitions 
 Since the focus of this study is on explaining determinants that impact the 
formation of a firm’s alliance, this study’s unit of analysis is based on the firm level. In 
defining an alliance, this study follows Gulati’s definition of strategic alliance as 
“voluntary agreements between firms involving exchange, sharing, and codevelopment 
of products, technologies, or services” (1998: 293). However, as alliances have been 
found to be heterogeneous in form and in function (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006; Ng, 
Unterschultz, & Laate, 2006), this study differentiates strategic alliances into two types 
of alliances; explorative alliance and exploitive alliance. Conceptually, explorative 
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alliance is an alliance that involves an “explore[ation of] new opportunities” while the 
exploitive alliance is an alliance to “exploit [an] existing capability” (Koza & Lewin, 
1998: 256). Specifically in the context of the pharmaceutical industry, the alliances 
“focused on basic research, drug discovery and development” have been characterized  
as explorative alliance while the alliances targeting “commercialization (clinical trials, 
FDA regulatory process, and marketing and sales)” reflect exploitive alliance 
(Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004:209-210).  
 
Assumptions 
 In developing this study’s conceptual model, we assume that each individual firm 
or its managers of strategic alliances are boundedly rational (Simon, 1982). Unlike the 
perfectly rational economic man of neo-classical economics, individual agents are 
boundedly rational because there are not only basic limits in the agent’s knowledge, but 
also cognitive limits in their ability to process information (Simon, 1982). This is an 
implicit assumption upon which AMC explanation stands because according to the logic 
of AMC, limits in cognitive ability and knowledge in managing alliances are improved 
by experience. Similarly, arguments related to the key factors, such as absorptive 
capacity, are also directly related to the assumption of bounded rationality. For instance, 
absorptive capacity is related to ‘learning’ such as assimilation of external knowledge in 
which learning is a concept that can not be compatible with perfect rationality 
assumption (Hayek, 1945). In addition, since the pharmaceutical industry is extremely 
complex industry, it is difficult to impose economic perfect rationality assumption in the 
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development of this study's model. Therefore, bounded rationality is most basic and 
implicit assumption of this study.    
 
 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
Alliance Management Capability (AMC) and Alliance Formation 
The alliance management capability entails a complex set of coordinating tasks 
that involve decisions about ‘alliance scope, alliance partner selection, and governance 
structure’ (Ireland et al., 2002). A specific emphasis of AMC is its attention to 
governance structures, coordination mechanism, and routines used in managing alliances 
(De Man, 2005; Draulans, deMan, & Volberda, 2003; Heimeriks, Klijn, & Reuer, 2009; 
Kale et al., 2002; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006). A basic argument underlying a firm’s 
AMC is that a firm’s past experiences in management alliance serves to develop routines 
that promote the governance and coordination of future alliances. Firms develop a 
greater capability in governing and coordinating alliances if they have more alliance 
experience because inferences or insights from the past experiences are embodied in 
routines (Nelson &Winter, 1982) and routines facilitate the governing and coordinating 
current and future alliances (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Kale et al., 2002; Zollo, Reuer, 
& Singh, 2002). Therefore, a firm with greater alliances experiences yields an AMC that 
promotes the formation of future alliances, because this prior experience reduces the 
governance cost of managing multiple alliances (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Ireland et 
al., 2002; Kale et al., 2002). This was empirically supported by the finding that firms 
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learn to better govern and coordinate alliances as experience accumulates (Anand & 
Khanna, 2000; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006). Because a firm’s alliance experiences are 
strongly correlated with a firm’s cumulative alliances (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Hoang 
& Rothaermel, 2005; Kale et al., 2002; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Zollo et al., 2002), 
AMC explanations suggest there should be a positive relationship between a firm’s 
cumulative alliances and the formation of new alliances.  
 
Diminishing Effects of Alliance Experiences 
 However, other studies have suggested a firm’s formation of alliances is not a 
strictly positive function of a firm’s AMC – cumulative alliance experiences. Bounded 
rationality yields information processing constraints that limit the number of alliances 
that can be formed by a firm’s management. As the number of alliances increases, 
managers face increasing challenges in governing and monitoring the behavior of their 
alliance partners towards a common objective. For instance, these difficulties are 
heightened when partners are opportunistic to which increases the cost of monitoring 
strategic partners and thus reducing incentives to form alliances (Das & Teng, 1996, 
2000; Inkpen, 2001; Ireland et al., 2002). Moreover, with increases in alliances 
experiences, bounded rationality can lead to myopic views that restrict managers to 
focus on exploiting synergies of past partnerships and thus preclude the exploration of 
synergies among new partners. These considerations suggest alliances experience – as 
reflected by the cumulative alliances - can yield diminishing returns and has been 
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empirically supported by the pharmaceutical studies of Deeds and Hill (1996) and 
Rothaermel and Deeds (2006).  
One basic implication of this diminishing return effect finding is that such 
diminishing effects suggest that a firm’s decision to form an alliance may be dependent 
on the relationship between a firm’s cumulative alliances experiences and that of this 
point of diminishing returns. Specifically, in terms of new product development, Deeds 
and Hill (1996) and Rothaermel and Deeds (2006) regarded this point of diminishing 
return as a form of an ‘optimum’ AMC because it reflects “a firm’s maximum ability to 
manage alliances effectively” (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006: 433). Deviations from this 
point of diminishing return may impact a firm’s propensity to form an alliance (Patzelt et 
al., 2008; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006). When a firm’s cumulative alliance experiences or 
current AMC falls below this point of diminishing return – termed as a low relative 
AMC – the increase in alliance experiences through the formation of new alliance will 
thus increase a firm’s performance. Deviations below from this point of optimal returns 
should thus favor the greater formation of alliances. However, due to the diminishing 
return effect, the rate of increase in alliance formation increases at a decreasing rate. 
Consequently, as a firm accumulates excessive alliance experiences (i.e. greater number 
of past alliances) beyond this point of diminishing returns – termed as a high relative 
AMC-, the firm is likely to reduce the number of future alliances. This is because much 
of the alliance benefits have been exploited by earlier alliance formation. Namely, 
beyond this point of diminishing return, benefits of alliances, such as synergies, have 
been much exploited by prior alliance relationships. Furthermore, increasing alliances 
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leads to increasing governance cost to which contributes to such diminishing returns.  As 
a result, this study proposes that relative to the point of diminishing returns, there is a 
positive relationship between AMC and alliance formation when a firm’s AMC is 
located below the point of diminishing return, i.e., low relative AMC. While, negative 
relationship between AMC and alliance formation occurs when a firm’s AMC is located 
above the point of diminishing return, i.e., high relative AMC. These arguments are 
reflected by the following proposition. 
Hypothesis 1a: Relative to the point of diminishing returns, a firm’s AMC has an 
inverted U-shaped relationship to a firm’s alliance formation.  
 
Different Types of Alliance and Diminishing Effects of Alliances Experiences 
However, as alliances are formed to achieve specific cost related objectives as 
well as innovation related objectives, firms have been found to be involved in the 
formation of exploitive and explorative alliances (Koza & Lewin, 1998; Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006; Park et al., 2002; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004, 2006). The distinction 
between exploitation and exploration was recognized earlier by March (1991) who 
defines:  
“The essence of exploitation is the refinement and extension of existing 
competencies, technologies and paradigms…The essence of exploration is 
experimentation with new alternatives” (1991: 85). 
Most notably, exploitation and exploration are distinct search activities that have been 
commonly viewed as “competing trade-offs” (Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991; 
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Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006). Such trade-offs stem from the “principle of learning 
substitution” in which “fast adaptation at one level in an organization leads to slow 
adaptation at others” (Levinthal & March, 1993: 101). For instance, although a goal of 
exploitation ultimately yields improvements in a firm’s efficiencies, such efficiency 
gains are made at the expense of a firm’s goals to explore. This is because exploration 
emphasizes experimentation rather than a refinement of activities (e.g. March, 1991). 
Moreover, another distinction between exploitation and exploration is that since 
exploitation favors the leveraging of established experiences, exploitation tends to yield 
returns that are more immediate and less uncertain than exploration. Researchers have 
subsequently extended such concepts of exploitation and exploration to the study of 
alliances (e.g. Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Ng et al., 2006). Exploration and exploitation 
alliances serve, respectively, the functions of ‘exploring new opportunities’ and ‘exploit 
the existing capabilities’ of partnered firms (Koza & Lewin, 1998: 256).  
 Since there are diminishing effects to alliance formation, this study thus argues 
that when a firm exhibits a relatively low AMC, firms prefer the formation of 
‘exploitive’ alliances over that of ‘explorative’ alliances. This is because since 
exploitation builds upon established experiences, the formation of exploitive alliance is 
favored over exploration because it serves to leverage a common body of experiences. 
Furthermore, because the returns to explorative alliance are more uncertain due to their 
more costly experimentations, especially in pharmaceutical industry (Koza & Lewin, 
1998; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), firm will thus favor the more immediate and less 
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uncertain returns of exploitive alliance. This is because returns from exploitation involve 
refinements to a firm’s established experiences.  
When a firm exhibits a high relative AMC, the firm favors the reduction of 
exploitive alliance over that of explorative alliances. Under conditions of a high relative 
AMC, firms by definition of the diminishing return effect face declining returns to their 
alliance efforts. Under such declining conditions, firms are more likely to be risk takers 
as implied by prospect theory. Namely, according to prospect theory, a firm becomes a 
risk seeker when its returns fall below a particular reference point, such as a firm’s past 
performance. While, conversely the firm becomes a risk averter when its returns falls 
above this reference point (e.g. Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; Lehner, 2000; Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979). Hence, in drawing on such arguments, this study argues that a firm’s 
point of diminishing returns can serve as a reference point to which influences a firm’s 
risk preferences in the formation of its alliance. Namely, due to the diminishing return 
effect, firm with a high relative AMC – above the point of diminishing returns - should 
favor greater risk taking. As exploration is generally a more risky activity than 
exploitation, such risk taking therefore involves the greater formation of explorative 
alliances than exploitive alliances. Furthermore, due to the highly risky returns as well as 
costs associated with exploration, exploration yield below average returns. As a result, as 
a firm accumulates alliances, beyond the point of diminishing returns, not only favors 
the greater risks of explorative alliances, but their below average returns yields a 
reduction in performance that is consistent with the diminishing return effect. This 
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reduction in performance that is associated with exploration thereby gives rise to the 
diminishing effects observed by Rothaermel and Deeds (2006). 
Hypothesis 1b: A relatively low AMC favors formation of exploitive alliances 
over that of explorative alliances. 
Hypothesis 1c: A relatively high AMC favors formation of explorative alliances 
over that of exploitive alliances. 
 
Absorptive Capacity  
Absent in AMC explanations is that the formation of an alliance is also 
dependent on a firm’s ability to learn from the experiences of its alliance partners. By 
accumulating experiences, a firm learns to relate to new and external sources of 
information and thus such learning enables the firm to form future alliances (Das & 
Teng, 2000; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Hamel, 1991; Holmqvist, 2004; Khanna 
et al., 1998; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Larsson et al., 1998; Powell et al., 1996; 
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006; Zhang, Baden-Fuller, & Mangematin, 2007). Such learning 
has been depicted by the concept of ‘absorptive capacity’. Absorptive capacity is defined 
as a firm’s ability to “evaluate, assimilate, and commercially apply new external 
knowledge” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990). A basic argument of absorptive capacity 
research is that a firm’s absorptive capacity is positively influenced by a firm’s 
accumulated experiences. A firm’s accumulated experiences are instrumental to the 
assimilation of new external information because prior knowledge facilitates a firm’s 
ability to relate to external information (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990). For instance, 
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Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) empirically showed that the effect of basic science on 
R&D spending (i.e. investment in absorptive capacity) positively influences the 
assimilation of new external knowledge.  
More recently, the concept of absorptive capacity has been extended to 
explaining the formation of a firm’s alliances (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Powell et al., 
1996). In particular, as new product / services, especially in the pharmaceutical industry, 
are the products of multiple technologies (i.e. Research and Commercializing 
technologies) that are not held by any one firm (Powell et al., 1996), a firm’s absorptive 
capacity should thus be instrumental in assimilating these technologies. As a result, a 
firm’s absorptive capacity should positively influence their formation of alliances. This 
is consistent with prior studies that have found a positive relationship between a firm’s 
cumulative experience and alliance performance (Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003; Tsai, 
2001; Van den Bosch, Volberda, & De Boer, 1999; Zollo et al., 2002). For instance, 
Nicholls-Nixon and Woo’s (2003) empirical findings indicate that a firm’s R&D 
promotes strategic alliances to improve its technical outputs such as pharmaceutical 
patents and new biotechnology products.  
Hypothesis 2a: Absorptive capacity promotes alliance formations. 
Although prior research has found absorptive capacity can promote alliances (e.g. Lane 
& Lubatkin, 1998), the effect of a firm’s absorptive capacity on the formation of 
exploitation or exploration alliances have not been examined (see Rothaermel & Deeds, 
2004). This study argues that since exploitive alliances exploit a firm’s current capability 
and promote commercialization (Koza & Lewin, 1998; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), a 
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firm’s absorptive capacity which is oriented to the commercialization of products and 
service should thus favor the formation of exploitive alliances. Furthermore, because 
absorptive capacity is a highly path dependent process that builds upon past experiences, 
such path dependency reinforces assimilation of experiences found in exploitive alliance. 
Thus, absorptive capacity should positively influence exploitive alliance formation. 
However, since increase in exploitation leads to reduction in exploration due to the 
“knowledge substitution effect,” absorptive capacity should thereby reduce incentives to 
form explorative alliances. In other words, due to the trade-off between exploitation and 
exploration, a firm’s absorptive capacity in developing exploitive alliance will drive out 
the efforts to form explorative alliances (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; March, 1991). 
Hence, increases in the formation of exploitive alliances will lead to reduced formations 
of explorative alliances.  
Hypothesis 2b: A firm’s absorptive capacity has a greater effect on the formation 
of exploitive alliances than that of explorative alliances. 
 
Competition 
 The formation of a firm’s alliances is also influenced by the competitive 
conditions of the market (e.g. Dickson & Weaver, 1997; Koza & Lewin, 1998; Park et 
al., 2002; Park & Zhou, 2005; Patzelt et al., 2008; Silverman & Baum, 2002). Prior 
research argued that alliances not only enable a firm to withstand competition, but also 
to impose stronger competition on its rivals because a firm can become better positioned 
through alliances by denying rivals access to resources (Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Gulati, 
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1995; Park & Zhou, 2005; Silverman & Baum, 2002; Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997). 
Thus competition promotes further alliance formation.  
 Hypothesis 3a: Competition promotes alliance formation. 
 However, the effects of competition on the formation of specific types of 
alliances have not been researched (e.g. Dickson & Weaver, 1997; Koza & Lewin, 1998; 
Park et al., 2002; Park & Zhou, 2005; Patzelt et al., 2008; Silverman & Baum, 2002). As 
competition promotes imitative processes, there are increasing pressures for firms to 
differentiate through the innovation of products and services (e.g. Schumpeter, 1934; 
Deephouse, 1999; Voss, Sirdeshmukh, & Voss, 2008). For instance, in Deephouse’s 
(1999) study of the banking industry, he found increasing competition promote 
increasing efforts to differentiate. This study argues with increasing competition, 
pressures to differentiate favor the formation of explorative alliances because explorative 
alliances expose the firm to new technological developments that are necessary to 
developing innovative products. Hence, competition promotes the formation of 
explorative alliances because access to new technologies not only develops new 
innovations, but as a consequence differentiates a firm’s products from its competitor’s 
offerings. However, due to the trade-off between the exploration and exploitation, 
increases in explorative alliances from increasing competition will lead to a decrease in 
exploitive alliance formation.  
 Hypothesis 3b: Competition promotes formation of explorative alliances more 




Data and Sample 
To examine factors (relative levels of AMC, absorptive capacity, competition)  
impacting the formation of a firm’s alliances – including exploitive alliance and 
explorative alliance, this study’s hypotheses are empirically tested in the 
pharmaceutical industry because strategic alliances have been extensively reported in 
the pharmaceutical industry (e.g. Deeds & Hill, 1996; Powell et al., 1996; Rothaermel 
& Deeds, 2004, 2006). To examine this study’s hypotheses, alliance data was drawn 
from Bioscan (American Health). Bioscan has been used in various pharmaceutical 
studies (e.g. Deeds & Hill, 1996; Powell et al., 1996; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Shan 
et al., 1994). To develop the absorptive capacity measure, financial data from the 
COMPUSTAT database of Standard and Poor (e.g. Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & 
Moesel, 1996), and Mergent Online were used. Competition was constructed from the 
patent database of United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) (e.g. Ahuja, 
2000; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Zhang et al, 2007).  
From these data sources, a panel data set of public pharmaceutical firms was 
constructed with 6 years of data from 1999 to 20042. Over this sample period, 326 bio 
and pharmaceutical firms were identified in the Bioscan data base. However, since the 
focus is only on pharmaceutical firms, 105 of the 326 firms with standard industrial 
classification (SIC) code of 2834 (‘pharmaceutical preparations’ (Rothaermel, 2001)) 
                                                 
2
 Because the date of the Bioscan data used in the study was not the end of December a given year, we 
used the 2005 Bioscan data to fully include a firm’s activities such as alliance formation of year 2004. The 
dependent variable of the current study is a longitudinal data from 2000 to 2004.    
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were used in this study’s sample. This subsample (SIC 2834) has been used in various 
empirical studies (e.g., Markman, Espina, & Phan, 2004; Rothaermel, 2001). 
Furthermore, this sample was chosen because all firms in this subsector involve the 
development of drugs that are subject to FDA regulations. With this restricted sample, 
8 firms were also removed because of missing alliance data. This resulted in a panel / 
longitudinal data set of 97 firms over the period of 1999 to 2004.  
The panel data set is advantageous for empirical research of this type because it 
increases the degrees of freedom and reduces the collinearity among explanatory 
variables and thereby improving the efficiency of econometric estimates (Hsiao, 1986). 
In addition, longitudinal / panel data estimations, such as ‘fixed effect estimations’, 
can account for unobserved heterogeneity in statistical analysis (Cameron, 1998). 
Since our unit of analysis is focused on the firm level, we would expect that given our 
constructs of relative AMC, and absorptive capacity, a high degree of unobserved 
heterogeneity is expected between firms in the sample.  
 
Dependent Variables  
Total alliance, explorative alliance and exploitive alliance. To measure 
alliance formation, total alliance variable is used. This variable is constructed by 
counting all agreements a firm has been involved in which includes the summation of 
the number of R&D, drug discovery, sales and marketing agreements found in Bioscan 
database (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). In drawing on previous empirical measures, 
explorative alliance is a count measure of the sum of the following types of agreements 
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found in Bioscan: basic research, drug discovery and development. These alliances types 
have been extensively used by various researchers (e.g. Park et al., 2002; Powell et al., 
1996; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). While, exploitive alliances is a count measure of the 
sum of commercializing agreements that consists of clinical trials, FDA regulatory 
process, and marketing and sales (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004: 209-210) and has been 
used by various alliance researchers (e.g., Deeds & Hill, 1996; Powell et al., 1996; 
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Shan et al., 1994).  
 
Explanatory Variables  
Relative alliance mangement capability (RAMC). Since RAMC is relative to a 
point of diminishing returns, RAMC is constructed as the difference between a firm’s 
current AMC as measured by its cumulative alliance and the optimal AMC. Specifically, 
as a firm’s AMC reflect its cumulative experiences with alliances, and alliance 
experience has been usually measured by cumulative number of alliance in prior 
research (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Kale et al., 2002; 
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Zollo et al., 2002), this study defines AMC through the total 
number of alliances formed by the firm3. The optimal AMC refers to the point of 
diminishing returns. It is computed through a nonlinear panel regression4, as in equation 
1, of a count variable of a firm’s number of products developed on AMC and its squared  
                                                 
3
 More exactly speaking, the AMC is one year lagged variable of total alliance. So even when total 
alliance is used as dependent variable, RAMC is used as right hand variable because it is made based on 
one year lagged variable of total alliance. 
4
 The nonlinear regression is nonlinear in terms of ‘variables’. However, in econometrics, the term, 
‘nonlinear regression’, is usually used in terms of coefficient estimated (Gujarati, 2002).  
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term with controls, such as a firm’s size, age, innovativeness and diversity of which 
definitions are provided in control variable sections. This panel estimation using fixed 
effects is shown by the following equation 
Equation 1: NPD it+1 = b0 + b1* AMC it + b2*AMCit2 + B*Control variables it + Vit , 
where NPD is new products developed at t+1 period, AMC is total alliance at t period 
and B is coefficients of control variables, and Vit = ai + Uit , in which ai is fixed effect 
component of error term, Vit,  i = 1, 2, 3 … 97, t = 1, 2 … 5.  
With this estimation, the point of diminishing returns can thus be computed 
mathematically by solving the estimated function with respect to ‘AMC’ and setting this 
estimated equation to 0 (See also Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006). As a result, this computed 
value of the point of diminishing returns is 22 -as an integer number5 - in which a firm 
with 22 alliances maximizes its development of new products. Given this point, the 
RAMC is thus constructed as the difference in total alliance from this point of 
diminishing return. To interpret, RAMC, it takes a negative and positive value that 
respectively indicates a low and high relative AMC. However, for the low relative AMC, 
we use its absolute value to indicate size of RAMC, i.e. how far below a firm’s current 
AMC is located from the optimal AMC. Thereby the reduction in a firm’s RAMC 
regardless of being high or low indicates that the firm approaches to the optimum AMC. 
To capture points above and below the point of diminishing return, the variables 
RAMC_above and RAMC_below were created to respectively reflect high and low  
 
                                                 
5
 The solved value was 21.93 and it was rounded up to nearest integer number, 22 because the AMC is a 
count number of alliance.    
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RAMC. 
Absorptive capacity. Although there are other proposed measures of absorptive 
capacity (e.g. Zahra & George, 2002; Ng, 2007), a commonly used measure of 
absorptive capacity is the R&D intensity (e.g., Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Mowery, 
Oxley, & Silverman, 1996; Lane & Koka, 2006; Tsai, 2001). R&D intensity is measured 
by the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales. The financial data was from the Compustat 
database of Standard and Poor (e.g. Hitt et al., 1996), and Mergent Online. 
Competition. Unlike more traditional depictions of competition – as measured 
by the number of similar and competing firms, competition is defined as rivalry among 
firms with similar technologies (e.g. Henderson & Cockbun, 1994; McGrath & Nerkar, 
2004). This study draws on this distinction of competition because competition in a 
knowledge based industry such as pharmaceutical industry is not based similarity of 
firms but rather similarity in technologies. Patent data were used as a basis for 
construction of this study’s measure of competition in which innovations represented by 
patents are targets for competition. To develop such a measure of competition, the patent 
database of United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) was used. The USPTO 
patent database has its own classification system with class and subclass codes. For 
example, a typically classification has the following structures in with a classification of 
“482/1” indicates that the first number, 482, represents the class of invention. The 
number following the slash is the subclass of invention within the class. There are about 
450 classes of invention and about 150,000 subclasses of invention…” (USPTO website, 
http://www.uspto.gov/go/classification/help.htm#3). As shown in appendix 2, 
 68 
competition for any given year and firm, is calculated by the following steps. First, for a 
certain patent with class/subclass in a firm for a given year, we count all patents in the 
USPTO database which have the same class and subclass with the patent in the firm for 
the given year. Second, we count patents with same class/subclass within the firm (i.e., 
to check or count how many patents with same class/subclass within the firm). Third, we 
subtract the firm’s patent count –consisting of both the technical class and subsclass- 
from the whole USPTO database count for the patent being held by the focal firm. This 
difference is used to measure the extent of technological competition faced by the firm 
for the patent with a class/subclass. Third, we repeat the first to third processes for all 
different class/subclass patents within the firm. Finally we take the average over the 
class/subclass to derive a measure of a firm’s competition. This can be expressed 
through a following formula.  















 , T = total number of firms in USPTO, ija = total number of same patentj 
within a firmi, and patentj is a patent with a distinct class and subclass combination.  
 
Control Variables  
Common controls used in pharmaceutical studies consist of variables such as a 
firm’s size, age, innovativeness and technical diversity. The firm size is measured by the 
number of employees (e.g. Powell et al., 1996; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004, 2006; Shan 
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et al., 1994), while a firm age was measured based on its founding year (Powell et al., 
1996; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004, 2006; Silverman & Baum, 2002). A firm’s 
innovativeness was measured by a count variable of the firm’s most recent 5 years of 
cumulative patents (e.g., patents of 1995,1996,1997,1998, and 1999 are summed for 
innovativeness of year 1999, the sum of patents from 1996 to 2000 is innovativeness of 
year 2000, etc) which is consistent with prior research (Ahuja, 2000; Rothaermel & 
Deeds, 2004, 2006; Stuart & Podolny, 1996; Silverman & Baum, 2002). A firm’s 
technical diversity was measured by counting the distinct classes in which a firm’s 
patents are categorized. This is also consistent with previous research (Rothaermel & 
Deeds, 2004, 2006; Shan et al., 1994; Silverman & Baum, 2002). 
 
Model Specification and Estimation 
Our data set is a panel data which consist of 6 years of 97 cross-sectional units. 
Because the 97 pharmaceutical firms may have their own unique characteristics, such as 
unique resources and capabilities, which are not easily observable (Barney, 1991) but 
can have a statistically significant effect (Powell et al., 1996), panel analysis especially 
with fixed effect estimation is appropriate (Baltagi, 2001; Hsiao, 1986; Powell et al., 
1996). Specifically, we use fixed effect estimation of this panel data because random 
effect estimation is based on an assumption that individual effects are uncorrelated with 
the explanatory variables, i.e. if unobserved effects are correlated with the explanatory 
variables, the random effects estimators are inconsistent (Baltagi, 2001; Cameron, 1998; 
Mundlak, 1978). In this study, the key explanatory variables such as alliance 
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management capability and absorptive capacity are influenced by a firm’s past 
experiences and each firm’s experiences are not likely to be same among the (sample) 
firms. As a result, a firm’s unique unobservable aspects of experiences are likely to be 
influenced by these key explanatory variables6. In that regards, the fixed effect model is 
preferred because the assumption about the exogeneity of explanatory variables to the 
unobservable aspects is more strictly required in the random effect model than in the 
fixed effect model.  
With the fixed effect estimation, this study’s hypotheses were tested through a 
three step processes. First, for the 6 year panel data set, we examine the effects of a 
firm’s relative AMC (RAMC), absorptive capacity, and competition on total alliance 
formation. Equation 2 is estimated using a generalized method of moment (GMM) 
procedure that accounts for fixed effects. In this model, we consider a one year time lag 
between a dependent variable and right hand side variables because the formation of 
alliances is not instantaneous as recommended in prior research (e.g., Powell et al., 
1996). The equation 2 is as follows.  
Equation 2: Total alliances t+1 = 0η  + 1η *RAMC_below t + 2η *RAMC_above t + 
3η *Absorptive capacity t + 4η *Competition t + Θ *Control variables t + itΦ  , 
where itΦ  = iti Ω+ϕ , iϕ is a heterogeneous firm’s fixed effect component of error 
term itΦ , i = 1, 2, 3…97, t = 1, 2…5, Θ is coefficients of control variables.  
                                                 
6
 We also tested for the fixed effect by performing F-test of the joint significance of the fixed dummies, i.e. 
H0= a1=a2=a3=… a96=a97 as recommended in Baltagi (2001) and Hsiao(1986) with result that the 
hypothesis was significantly rejected at significance level of 1%, i.e. there was fixed effect significantly in 
our model.  
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An advantage of GMM procedure is it does not require any exact distribution 
assumptions on the disturbance terms of a model. While, for example, maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE), one of the more popular estimators, requires an assumption 
about a specific distribution of an estimated model, such as a normal distribution. Hence, 
GMM is a more robust estimation method. In addition, many common estimators such as 
OLS, IV, 2SLS and even MLE are special cases of GMM (Hamilton, 1994). GMM has 
also been recommended for panel estimation that involves count data (Cameron, 1998). 
GMM estimation is based on the assumption of ‘orthogonality conditions’ that the 
disturbances in the equations are not correlated with instrumental variables (Hansen, 
1982). Because researchers usually use the lagged variables of explanatory variables 
including constant term (e.g. Hansen & Singleton, 1982), this study also followed this 
procedure7. However, when the number of instrumental variables is greater than the 
number of coefficients estimated, the over-identifying restrictions should be tested for 
the validity of the restrictions (Newey & West, 1987a). The GMM draws out the 
estimates of parameters with which the correlations between disturbances and 
instrumental variables are as close to zero as possible, i.e. the distance from the zero is 
the smallest. GMM is also robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by using a 
proper weighting matrix (Newey & West, 1987b). So this study uses the 
heteroskedasticity robust GMM with an econometric analysis package, EVIEWS 5.1 of 
Quantitative Micro Software (QMS).  
                                                 
7
 We also included the two and three year lagged dependent variables for the set of instrumental variables 
as implied in dynamic panel data analysis (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Baltagi, 2001; Hsiao, 1986) because 
convergence in GMM estimation was not achieved even at the 10000 times iteration. 
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As a second step, after estimating the model of total alliance formation with 
equation 2, we estimate two models of explorative alliance formation and exploitive 
alliance formation with the following two equations respectively. We use GMM 
estimation method for each equation with consideration of fixed effect and 
heteroskedasticity robustness. 
Equation 3: Explorative alliances t+1 = 0α  + 1α *RAMC_below t + 2α *RAMC_above t 
+ 3α *Absorptive capacity t + 4α *Competition t + Α *Control variables t + itE  , 
where A is coefficients of control variables and itE  = iti U+δ , iδ is a heterogeneous 
firm’s fixed effect component of error term itE , i = 1, 2, 3…97, t = 1, 2…5.  
Equation 4: Exploitive alliances t+1 = 0β  + 1β *RAMC_below t + 2β *RAMC_above t + 
3β *Absorptive capacity t + 4β *Competition t + Β *Control variables t + itΓ  , 
where B is coefficients of control variables and itΓ = iti Ψ+γ , iγ is a heterogeneous 
firm’s fixed effect component of error term itΓ , i = 1, 2, 3…97, t = 1, 2…5.  
However, as a final step of our model specification, because the explorative 
alliances and exploitive alliances comprise a firm’s total alliances, we checked whether 
the two equations’ error terms are contemporaneously correlated as in a seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) model (Greene, 1997). They were significantly correlated 
with significance level of 0.01. To correct for this contemporaneous correlation of error 
terms between two equations, we estimated the two equations with a correction of 
contemporaneous correlation of the error terms. Specifically, in the GMM estimation we 
used Newey and West’s (1987b) weighting matrix which is robust to heteroskedasticity 
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and autocorrelation8 thereby addressing the contemporaneous correlation among these 
two equations and autocorrelation of each equation. In sum, our final estimation of the 
equation 3 and 4 for explorative alliance and exploitive alliance is estimated by a multi 
equation model with correction of the contemporaneous correlation over the equations. 
But the equation 2 for total alliance is estimated by a single equation model. 
 
Results 
 Table1 shows the means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlation of 
variables we used in this analysis. The descriptive statistics shows that the average firm 
in the sample holds 4 explorative alliances and exploitive alliances respectively. The 
average firm of our sample data is 31 years old and has 8800 employee. The average 
firm’s technical area is 4 and the number of cumulative patents of recent 5 years is 
averaged at 95. The average Low RAMC is 15 while the average High RAMC is 2. The 
R&D intensity shows R&D investment is 9 times larger than sales. On average, the firm 
faces 116 technical competitors. Although the descriptive table shows that correlations 
between certain variables are high, this is not so problematic because this study 
                                                 
8
 To consider the fixed effect panel estimates of each equation in the multi equation estimation, we used 
“Q transformation” which replaces each variable in an equation with the deviation from the mean of each 
cross-section unit over time within each variable (Baltagi, 2001:13). For example, Yit = a0 + a1*Xit + ui + 
vit, where ui is fixed effect component of each cross-section unit i in the error term. Through Q 
transformation such as QY= (Yit -  .iY ) using each variable’s mean of each cross-section over time, such 
as .iY and .iX  we still have consistent coefficient estimates of explanatory variables such as Xit as in an 
fixed effect model; we have QY = a1* QX + Qv, where QY= (Yit - .iY ), QX = (Xit - .iX ), Qv = (vit - 
.iv ). In addition, to our model, the estimates of the multiple equation estimation are similar to those of 
single equation with fixed effect. However, because .iv  in the Qv = (vit - .iv ) may create autocorrelation 
problem in a estimation of each equation (Baltagi,2001: 130) and in each equation there was first lag 
autocorrelation, we address this problems in the GMM estimation using Newey and West’s (1987b) 
weighting matrix option in the EViews 5.1.  
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estimates the models using panel data analysis and as a result has an advantage in 
dealing with multicollinearity among the variables (Baltagi, 2001; Hsiao, 1986)9.  In 
addition, the relatively high correlation between the two alliance data, such as 
explorative alliance and exploitive alliance, also supports our multiple equation 
estimation with correction of contemporaneous correlation and autocorrelation as in 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model.   
 Table 2 shows the result of a multiple equation estimation using GMM with 
correction of contemporaneous correlation and autocorrelation for explorative alliance 
and exploitive alliance as well as that of a single equation estimation for total alliance. 
However, before discussing the results of our tests, two issues about model specification 
are noted. First, the Durbin-Watson statistics show that exploitive alliance has no 
autocorrelation with its previous year while explorative alliance is located in ‘Zone of 
indecision’(Gujarati, 2002: 469) where decision on rejection of autocorrelation 
hypothesis is not applicable with the Durbin-Watson statistics. Thereby we take 
regression of the current residuals of the estimated explorative alliance equation on 
previous year residuals. The result showed that the coefficient of the previous year  
                                                 
9
 In appendix C we suggested correlations among variable which is transformed into the variables used in 
the panel data analysis because each variables are Q-transformed as introduced in the footnote 8. 
Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
Variables Mean S.D. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
1.   Explorative alliance 3.722  6.367  1.000           
2.   Exploitive alliance 4.054  5.679  0.772  1.000          
3.   Age 31.129  39.649  0.319  0.335  1.000         
4.   Size 8.843  23.146  0.599  0.518  0.607  1.000        
5.   Technology diversity 3.704  5.939  0.550  0.386  0.347  0.604  1.000       
6.   Innovativeness 94.984  202.610  0.552  0.392  0.380  0.585  0.848  1.000      
7.   RAMC_below 14.908  7.266  -0.797  -0.745  -0.329  -0.599  -0.566  -0.573  1.000     
8.   RAMC_above 2.061  7.942  0.815  0.796  0.331  0.530  0.359  0.375  -0.534  1.000    
9.   R&D intensity 9.137  67.244  -0.061  -0.053  -0.059  -0.051  -0.057  -0.054  0.072  -0.034  1.000   
10. Competition 115.878  209.192  0.004  -0.027  -0.110  -0.095  0.035  0.004  -0.013  -0.046  -0.035  1.000  






The GMM Results of Each Equation 
 Explorative alliance Exploitive alliance Total alliance 
       
Constant -0.1719 (0.1837) -1.3890***(0.2189) -1.9596***(0.2995) 
Age 0.0839 (0.1469) 1.0308*** (0.1818) 0.7840***(0.1829) 
Size -0.2827***  (0.0341) 0.1169*** (0.0269) -0.7194***(0.1423) 
Technology 
diversity -0.2113***  (0.0628) -0.3103*** (0.0823) -0.7548**(0.2382) 
Innovativeness -0.0044*  (0.0022) -0.0079*** (0.0022) -0.0151*(0.0066) 
RAMC_below -0.2281***  (0.0498) -0.5827*** (0.0630) -0.3059***(0.0499) 
RAMC_above 0.5281***  (0.0255) 0.4178*** (0.0275) 1.1999***(0.1522) 
Absorptive 
capacity -0.0002 (0.0005) 0.0030*** (0.0005) 0.0035*(0.0017) 
Competition 0.0025***  (0.0009) -0.0002(0.0009) 0.0009(0.0021) 
       
R-squared 0.6728 0.5116 0.912061 
Durbin-Watson 
stat 1.8121 1.9587 1.3140 9:9  
J-statistic 0.231162 14.44621 
Standard errors in parentheses. ;  p < 0.1,  * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001. The exploitive alliance and 
explorative alliance were estimated with a multiple equation model while total alliance was estimated with 
a single equation model. †† We checked autocorrelation with error terms of the equations, i.e. whether the 
error term itE  = iti U+δ  and ititit UU ερ += −1 , in which iδ is a heterogeneous firm’s fixed effect 
component of error term itE . The ρ  was not significant at 5% significance level with suggestion of no 
autocorrelation.  
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residual was not significant at even level of 10%; a hypothesis that the estimated 
coefficient is zero is statistically ‘not rejected’, i.e., accepted. Hence we concluded that 
there is no autocorrelation in the estimated equations, i.e. the correction of 
autocorrelation in the multiple equation estimation was properly made10. Second, we 
tested for the validity of over-identifying instrument variables in GMM estimation 
because the number of instrumental variables was greater than the number of estimated 
coefficients. For this purpose, the J-statistic, that minimizes the value of the objective 
function of GMM estimation, is used to test the hypothesis that the over-identifying 
restrictions are valid using a chi-square distribution (Newey & West, 1987a). With 
degree of freedom equal to the number of the over-identifying restrictions (here, 34), the 
hypothesis of the validity was accepted even at the 10% significance level11.  
 The hypotheses of this study were then tested using the GMM technique on these 
equations (i.e., equation 2, 3 and 4). To test hypothesis 1a, we checked whether total 
alliance formation which is the sum of explorative alliance formation and exploitive 
alliance formation was monotonically increasing or decreasing regardless of a firm’s 
RAMC_below or RAMC_above. Given that we had converted the RAMC_below variable 
to absolute value terms, the inverted U-shaped relationship between the alliance 
formation and a firm’s AMC should have negative signs coefficients for not only the  
                                                 
10
 We also checked autocorrelation for the total alliance model with error terms of the equations, i.e. 
whether the error term itE  = iti U+δ  and ititit UU ερ += −1 , in which iδ is a heterogeneous firm’s 
fixed effect component of error term itE . The ρ  was not significant at 5% significance level with 
suggestion of no significant autocorrelation. 
11
 This was also tested for the total alliance model with a result that the over-identifying restrictions were 
significantly valid even at a significance level of 10%. 
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RAMC_above variable but also for the RAMC_below variable. Namely, the larger the 
value that the variable RAMC_below takes, the further removed is the firm’s cumulative 
experiences are from the point of diminishing returns. Therefore, in accordance to the 
invert U shaped relationship, this larger deviation from this point of diminishing returns 
should lead to a reduction in the number of alliances formed. Hence, this yields a 
negative sign coefficient between RAMC_below and alliance formation. While, similarly, 
larger values for the variable RAMC_above reflect larger distances from the point of 
diminishing returns and thus in accordance to inverted U Shape relationship, should lead 
to a reduction in the number of alliances formed. To test these non-monotonic effects,  
the results of table 2 show the estimates of the coefficients of RAMC_below are 
significantly negative, but those of RAMC_above are significantly positive respectively 
at 0.1% significance level for total alliance formation ( 1η = -0.3059, 2η =1.1999). This 
result indicates despite arguments for a diminishing return effect, a firm’s alliances 
formation is generally positively related to a firm’s Relative AMC. This tendency is also 
observed with explorative alliance formation and exploitive alliance formation. Thereby, 
these results does not support hypothesis 1a.  
   Hypothesis 1b was tested by comparing the size of coefficients of RAMC_below 
between explorative alliance formation and exploitive alliance formation. While, 
hypothesis 1c was tested by comparing the size of coefficients of RAMC_above between 
explorative alliance formation and exploitive alliance formation. For hypothesis 1b with 
results shown in table 2, the Wald test with H0: 11 βα = , H1: 11 βα < , in which 
5827.02281.0 11 −=−= βα and are both negative, using the notations of equation 3 and 
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4 for convenience, these results shows that H0 is rejected at the 0.1% significance level 
(chi-square =14.77576, p = 0.0001) and thereby satisfies the hypothesis 1b. For 
hypothesis 1c with result at table 2, a Wald test with H0: 22 βα = , H1: 22 βα > , in which 
4178.05281.0 22 == βα and , shows that H0 is rejected at the 5% significance level 
(chi-square = 5.151931, p = 0.0232). Thereby, these results support the arguments of 
hypothesis 1c. 
 The hypothesis 2a and 2b examines the effect of a firm’s absorptive capacity - as 
measured by the coefficients of a firm’s R&D intensity- on alliance formations. 
Hypothesis 2a was tested by checking the effect of absorptive capacity on a firm’s total 
alliance formation. As shown in table 2, the estimated coefficient, 3η =0.0035, is 
significant at the 5% level and is positive. For hypothesis 2b, the unique effects of 
absorptive capacity on explorative alliance formation and exploitive alliance formation 
are examined. The Wald test using H0: 33 βα =  , H1: 33 βα < , with 0002.03 −=α and 
0030.03 =β  shows that H0 is rejected at 0.01% significance level (chi-square = 
19.78876, p = 0.0000). Thereby, this result supports the argument of hypothesis 2b in 
which absorptive capacity promotes the formation of exploitive alliances more than that 
of explorative alliance.  
 Hypothesis 3a and 3b examines the effect of competition on alliance formation. 
In hypothesis 3a we examined the effect of competition on total alliance formation by 
testing whether the estimated coefficient of competition is significantly positive. The 
estimated coefficient, 4η = 0.0009 was positive but not significant even at the 10% 
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significance level. We can not tell that hypothesis 3a is satisfied due to the insignificant 
result of the effect of competition on total alliance formation even though it was positive. 
For hypothesis 3b, we compared the effects of competition on explorative alliance 
formation and exploitive alliance formations. Wald test H0: 44 βα = , H1: 44 βα > , with 
0025.04 =α  and 0002.04 −=β  shows that H0 is rejected at 5% significance level (chi-
square = 3.044041, p = 0.0810)12. This result supports the argument of hypothesis 3b. 
 In addition, to account for control variables in our analysis, the result from table 
2 shows that the larger the size of the firm (i.e. employees), the greater the formation of 
exploitive alliances. Older firms as measured by age favor exploitive alliances rather 
than explorative alliance formation because exploitive alliance tends to leverage past 
experiences. However, a firm’s innovativeness –as measured by cumulative patents- and 
technology diversity –as measured by patents- both have negative effects on alliance 
formation regardless of alliance types.  
 
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 This study examined the determinants of alliance formation- diminishing return 
effect of alliances, absorptive capacity and competition, which have not been considered 
by AMC explanation. Unlike our expectation, diminishing return effect of alliance did 
not have significant effect on alliance formation in terms of total alliance. However, 
                                                 
12
 Because EViews 5.1, a statistical package we use for estimation, shows the p-value based on two-sided 
test, the p-value at one-sided test as in our study must be divided by 2 as in EViews 5.1 user’s guide 
(Quantitative Micro Software, 2005: 451).  
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despite this lack of significance, the point of diminishing returns appears to distinctly 
influence the formation of different types of alliances, i.e., explorative alliance and 
exploitive alliance. A firm’s absorptive capacity and its external competition had also 
significant influences to alliance formation in terms of both total alliances and different 
types of alliances. 
 In explaining these findings, the lack of diminishing return effects for total 
alliances could be explained by two reasons involving a firm’s response to risk or 
measurement error regarding the constructing of variables. First, with respect to a firm’s 
response to risk, when a firm faces declines in its return, the firm rather takes more risks, 
such as increasing alliance formation. As prior research argued, alliance formation faces 
a high risk of fail. Prior research argued that the failure rate of alliances reaches 40 to 
70% (Dyer et al., 2001; Heimeriks et al., 2009; Kale et al., 2002; Park & Ungson, 2001). 
Such risk taking with declines in a firm’s return was also empirically supported by a fact 
that troubled firms tend to take more risky actions (e.g. Bowman, 1980; Bromiley, 1991, 
Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; March & Shapira, 1987). This was also partly supported 
by our results about the formation of specific types of alliances. That is, explorative 
alliance which is regarded as a more risky alliance was increased more than the less 
risky alliance, i.e., exploitive alliance. In addition, with respect to measurement error 
regarding the construction of our variables, the optimal return was held to be the same 
for all panel members in constructing diminishing return point. Even though we 
constructed the diminishing return point considering heterogeneity of each firm in panel 
data analysis, it would be better to consider each panel member’s optimal return level 
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individually. To address this problem, a sufficiently long times series data for each panel 
members is required. This will be a subject of future research.  
 Our empirical result also shows that the alliance formation is affected by a firm’s 
internal and external factors as previous research has argued (Koza & Lewin, 1998; 
McKelvey, 1997; Patzelt et al., 2008; Park et al., 2002). A firm’s internal learning 
capacity, i.e. absorptive capacity was positively related to the alliance formation as 
suggested by previous research (Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003; Tsai, 2001; Van den 
Bosch et al., 1999; Zollo et al., 2002). However, a firm’s absorptive capacity’s effect on 
alliance formation was distinct depending on the types of alliances. The empirical result 
of this study shows that explorative alliance formation was not increased by a firm’s 
absorptive capacity while exploitive alliance was. This result implies that due to the path 
dependent nature of absorptive capacity, it can enhance a “substitution effect” between 
that of the explorative and exploitive alliances. That is, the path dependency of a firm’s 
absorptive capacity leads to increase in the exploitive alliances to which create rigidities 
in exploring new opportunities that are associated with explorative alliances (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Levinthal & March, 1993; Levitt & March, 
1988). 
  A firm’s external competition in a general sense has also been found to positively 
impact the formation of alliances as suggested by previous research (e.g. Dickson & 
Weaver, 1997; Koza & Lewin, 1998; Park et al., 2002; Patzelt et al., 2008). However, 
the specific impact was different depending on the types of alliances. This study shows 
that the effect of competition on explorative alliance formation is positive while the 
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effect of competition on exploitive alliance formation is negative but insignificant. This 
result is consistent with previous empirical findings that competitive market encourages 
explorative alliance formation (e.g., Park et al., 2002). As competition becomes severe 
and thereby the firm’s competitive advantage is increasingly threatened, a firm’s inertial 
force gives way to new path or new experimentations that encourage exploration 
(Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Voss et al., 2008). 
Deephouse (1999) also argued that due to imitation by competitors, firms increasingly 
seek to differentiate as competition is intensified. The explorative alliances better serves 
such differentiation activities than exploitive alliances because exploration is related to 
experimentation of new opportunities while the exploitation is related to refinement of 
current capabilities (Koza & Lewin, 1998). Thus, competition becomes a significant 
determinant to formation of different types of alliances. 
 Finally, this study has several limitations which may lead to a future research 
agenda. First, we did not link the specific managerial techniques in the alliance 
management to the alliance formation. The specific managerial techniques such as 
alliance evaluation, usage of alliance specialists, and alliance training (Draulans et al., 
2003; Heimeriks et al., 2009) may provide more specificity on alliance formation and 
can provide considerable implications to practitioners. Second, our empirical calculation 
of the diminishing return level in the alliance management capability needs some caution 
in their interpretation. Because the calculation is based on our panel dataset of 97 
pharmaceutical companies over 6 years with consideration of fixed effect of the firms, 
the result of the calculation is not an absolute value, but rather a changeable value 
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depending on data set. For example, Rothaermel and Deeds’ (2006) empirical research 
based on 325 biotech firms showed the diminishing level of around 12 alliances. This 
result is however based on 32 large pharmaceutical firms that had a level of 26 in terms 
of number of exploitive alliances13. Because of the difference in several aspects related 
to the panel dataset such as year range and number of firms, the diminishing return level 
of the alliances are different among the above empirical research.  
  Our study provides some crucial implications to practitioners such as managers 
of the alliances. Because alliance formation is significantly influenced by a firm’s 
absorptive capacity and competition, managers need to account for their firms’ 
absorptive capacity and the competitive environment. Furthermore, because a firm’s 
absorptive capacity is highly path dependent it impacts the formation of exploitive 
alliance especially under competitive conditions. Managers should understand the effect 
of absorptive capacity and competition to better balance the formation of different types 
of alliances. 
 This study has several contributions to alliance research, especially to alliance 
management capability research. First, because empirical examinations of the 
determinants of alliance formation, especially with respect to exploration and 
exploitation are limited, this study contributes to addressing these shortcomings14 (see, 
                                                 
13
 We calculated these levels from the results presented in their research. In addition, the level for 
explorative alliance of Rothaermel and Deeds’s (2004) was around 20 but the estimates of the coefficient 
of the explorative alliance were not significant. 
14
 As Lavie and Rosenkopf (2006) argued, the determinants of the explorative and exploitive alliances 
have been mostly limited to market uncertainty and turbulence (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004; 
Park et al, 2002; Rothaermel, 2001; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Rowley, Behrens, & Krackerhardt, 2000) 
and extent of resource abundance (Park et al, 2002). 
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 Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). This empirical study supports the substitution effect 
between exploration and exploitation in alliance formation (Koza & Lewin, 1998; Lavie 
& Rosenkopf, 2006) to which absorptive capacity can play a mediating role. Second, 
absorptive capacity has not been formally tested in the context of exploration / 
exploitation alliance formation (see, Lane & Koka 2006; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). In 
that regard, this study contributes to this area because to our knowledge, the effects of 
absorptive capacity on explorative and exploitive alliances have not been empirically 
examined. Finally, the consideration of competition as an important factor impacting 








 A firm’s risk preference is often revealed by its strategic choice on risky 
alternatives (Das & Teng, 2001; Fiegenbaum et al, 1996; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
Traditionally, risk preference has been assumed as fixed as in financial portfolio theory. 
The portfolio theory assumes that decision makers such as firms are risk averse and 
thereby they take risk only if they are compensated by high returns. As a result of risk 
aversion, financial portfolio theory argues for ‘positive relationship’ between risk and 
return (Fiegenbaum et al, 1996). However, the positive relationship between risk and 
return is often not supported in the context of alliance formation because firms have 
been found to undertake the formation of risky alliance even though the expected return 
are not commensurate with such risks (Park & Zhou, 2005; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006). 
Previous empirical research about alliance formation showed that the highly risky 
alliances face lower returns that lower risk alliances (Deeds & Hill, 1996; Rothaermel & 
Deeds, 2006). For instance, in a pharmaceutical industry the rate of an approved drug of 
a high risk alliance was reported as 14% while that of a low risk alliance was 26% 
(Lerner et al., 2003; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006). This empirical finding implies firms 
form alliances that have high risk face low returns. This not only contradicts risk 
aversion assumption of portfolio theory, but also the positive risk-return trade-offs. 
 87 
Thereby, the objective of this study is to resolve a research question:  ‘why do firms 
form risky alliances that have low returns?’  
One explanation to this paradox is prospect theory. The prospect theory and more 
broadly behavioral approaches argue risk preferences are not fixed (March & Shapira, 
1987; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Sitkin & Weingart 1995; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This 
body of research argues that a firm’s risk preference varies with distance from a given 
reference point. In particular, a firm becomes a risk seeker when its return fall below a 
reference point, such as average profit of an industry or a firm’s historical profits, and 
conversely the firm is risk averse when its returns fall above this reference point 
(Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; Lehner, 2000; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Thus, when 
a firm’s returns are relatively low to its reference point, the firm is more likely to form a 
high risk alliance. Conversely, when a firm’s return is relatively high to its reference 
point, the firm will prefer the formation of low risk alliance than that of high risk 
alliance. Hence, prospect theory and related behavioral theories can provide insights to 
our research question.  
However, despite a growth of behavioral explanations in management research, 
prospect and behavioral explanations of risk preferences have been rarely applied in the 
context of alliance formation (see Das & Teng, 1996; Brass et al., 2004; Bromiley, 
Miller, & Rau, 2001; Gulati, 1998; Inkpen, 2001; Ireland et al., 2002 for review of 
alliance formation and risk related research in strategic management). A firm’s risk 
preference is likely to impact the choice of different types of alliances because risk 
preference can be revealed by a firm’s choice over different risky alternatives. In 
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particular, as risk seeking behavior involves activities with uncertain and generally 
costly activities, risk seeking preferences can thus be revealed by a firm’s high risk 
alliances while risk aversion can be revealed by a firm’s choice of low risk alliances. 
Conceptually, a high risk alliance is an alliance of which outcome is relatively more 
uncertain, requires more time and effort than that of low risk alliance. For instance, in 
the pharmaceutical industry, Rothaermel and Deeds argued that in terms of the 
unpredictable nature of alliances, alliances focusing on basic research, drug discovery 
and development are relatively more risky than alliances that target on 
“commercialization (clinical trials, FDA regulatory process, and marketing and sales)” 
(2004: 209-210). The former type of alliance has been also argued as more costly and 
time-consuming than the latter types of alliances because R&D activities need more 
coordination in intra- and inter-firm relations (Pisano, 1990; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006; 
Teece, 1992).  
Although prior research (e.g., Deeds & Hill, 1996; Park et al., 2002; Powell et al., 
1996; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004, 2006; Shan et al., 1994) has examined a firm’s choice 
of these types of alliances, they have not given a behavioral explanation for such choices. 
This study argues choices in these different types of alliances are the result of changes in 
a firm’s risk preferences that varies according to deviations between a firm’s 
performance and its reference point. That is, this study applies the reasoning of prospect 
theory and behavioral theory to explaining the underlying risk preferences that impact 
the choices of these different types of alliances. 
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When it comes to a firm’s reference point or aspiration level, it is often 
dependent on ‘comparison to relevant others (i.e., industry norm or average) or to its 
own past performance’ (Bromiley et al., 2001; Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 1998; Lant, 
1992). Thus, a firm’s past performance (i.e., experience) may increase or decrease the 
reference point or aspiration level. Furthermore, because a firm’s past experiences in the 
development of new technologies impact a firm’s performance, such experiences can 
therefore also influences a firm’s risk preference. Furthermore, a firm’s technology 
choices also serve to reflect a firm’s risk preferences. For instance, the development of a 
technology dissimilar to a firm’s prior technologies can be regarded as risk taking 
experience while the development of technologies similar to a firm’s established fields 
of expertise can be regarded as risk aversion experience. This is because the dissimilar 
technologies are relatively more difficult to develop and their expected outcomes are 
more uncertain than technologies based on similar experiences. Hence, this study 
examines the experience effect, especially a new technology experience effect, on risk 
preference in alliance formation.  
 In organizing this study, this study’s unit of analysis, definitions and assumptions 
are stated. The study’s theoretical developments follow in which testable hypotheses are 
developed. The next section provides a discussion of the data and panel estimation using 
generalized method of moment (GMM). A discussion of the results follows. Lastly, the 





Unit of Analysis 
 Because a firm’s choice over different types of risky alliance is a consequence of 
the firm underlying risk preference, the unit of analysis is at the firm. This firm level 
analysis includes the formation of alliances with different levels of risks; that includes 
relatively high risk alliances, such as R&D and drug discovery related agreements and 
low risk alliances, such as marketing, distribution, and sale related agreements (Pisano, 
1990; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004, 2006; Teece, 1992). 
  
Assumptions and Definitions 
 Because there is no prior research about risk preference and its measure in 
alliance formation research, this study makes the assumption that a firm’s strategic 
choice over risky alternatives reveals its risk preference15. In other words, in the context 
of alliance formation, a firm’s risk preference is defined through its strategic choices 
over alliances that vary in their risks characterized by high and low risk alliances. From 
here on, we refer alliance formation to a choice between high risk alliance and low risk 
alliance. Based on Sitkin and Pablo (1992), the riskiness of an alliance is based on the 
predictability of the expected outcome of alliances and the cost or difficulties in 
                                                 
15
 This is also a basic assumption used in the construction of experiment-based utility function (e.g., 
Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & Paraschiv, 2007; Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & L’Haridon, 2008) as well as in 
choice theory of neo classical economics (e.g., Mas-Colell et al, 1995). However, this assumption does not 
equal to the assumption of the ‘weak axiom of revealed preference’ as in choice theory of neo classical 
economics. The weak axiom asserts that for alternatives x and y, if x is ever chosen over y when both are 
feasible, “x is revealed at least as good as y” but this preference is constant as long as both alternatives are 
feasible (Mas-Colell et al, 1995). We agree with the revealed preference of x over y if x is chosen over y, 
but we do not accept its constancy because the preference can be changed by other factors (Machina, 
1987). 
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achieving the expected outcome. Conceptually, the high risk alliance is an alliance of 
which outcome is relatively more uncertain and requires more time and effort than that 
of low risk alliance. Since this paper assumes a firm’s choice of its alliance risk is a 
result of its risk preference, the concept of risk taking (or risk aversion) in alliance 
formation is defined by a ratio of high risk (or low risk) alliance formation to total 
alliance formation. Changes in a firm’s risk preference can thus be examined by 
observing how this ratio is changed.  
This study also argues that a firm’s risk preference at alliance formation is 
impacted by a firm’s experience in a new technology development. To develop this  
argument, we assume that a firm’s risk preference is also revealed by the firm’s 
experiences with a technology. Specifically, the development of a technology similar to 
a firm’s prior technology is regarded as risk aversion experience while a technology that 
involve dissimilar technology is regarded as risk taking experience.  
 
 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
Prospect Theory: Risk Behavior 
 Risk has been an essential element of strategic choice behavior of organizations 
(e.g., Bromiley et al., 2001; Fiegenbaum et al., 1996; Ruefli, Collins, & Lacugna, 1999). 
Strategic choices are reflection of one’s risk preference (Das & Teng, 2001; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). Risk preference has been traditionally assumed as fixed and has been 
extensively examined in Financial Portfolio theory. Most prevalent assumption has been 
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that firms are risk averse and to which yields positive risk-return relationship. That is, 
firms take on higher risk only if they are compensated by high returns (Bettis, 1981; 
Schoemaker, 1982). However, this positive relationship between risk and return has been 
also challenged by empirical findings that firms increase returns and reduce risk 
concurrently16 (Bowman, 1980; Cool & Dierickx, 1987; Fiegenbaum et al., 1996; 
Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1986). As in figure 2, the mixture of these two relationships, i.e., 
positive and negative relationship in the risk-return interface, has been a subject of 
discussion in prospect theory and behavioral theory.  
 
Figure 2 













Curve 1: risk-averse behavior. Curve 2: risk-seeking behavior and / or good 
managers can increase return and reduce risk simultaneously. Curve 3: risk-
seeking and risk-averse behavior in the domain of losses and gains respectively 
(Fiegenbaum et al., 1996: 221). 
                                                 
16
 The negative relationship was also described in an opposite way, i.e., troubled firms take more risk 









 Based on the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), they find that 
individuals whose returns fall below a reference point tend to be ‘risk taking’ while 
individuals tend to be ‘risk avoiding’ when returns fall above this reference point. Such 
arguments have been empirically supported at the firm level (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 
1988; Lehner, 2000). March and Shapira’s (1987) survey that is based on interviews 
with numerous managers also showed that risk taking increases as a firm’s return departs 
from their aspiration level, as measured by an industry average return or a firm’s past 
returns. Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) and Bromiley (1991) empirically supported this 
with findings that indicate firms with returns below this aspiration level or reference 
point took on greater risks. Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) and Bromiley (1991) also 
found that firms who earn returns beyond this aspiration or reference point did not take 
on greater risk. Hence, these findings not only offered a fundamental challenge to the 
traditional assumption of risk preference but also provided a new base to interpret a 
firm’s behavior in relation to the risk / return paradox, such as the negative relationship 
in alliance formation between high risk alliance formation and its low expected return. 
This is further elaborated in the next section. 
      
Strategic Risk Behavior in Alliance Formation  
Though firms form strategic alliances as a way to reduce risk in uncertain 
environments (Hagedoorn, 1993; Kogut, 1991), there is no prior research about a firm’s 
risk preference, i.e., a firm’s risk taking or risk aversion, in the alliance formation 
research (see Brass et al., 2004; Bromiley et al., 2001; Gulati, 1998; Inkpen, 2001; 
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Ireland et al., 2002 for review of alliance formation and risk related research in strategic 
management). Furthermore, because the traditional explanation of risk preference is 
often inconsistent with alliance formation, we examine whether prospect theory and 
behavioral theory can explain the risk preference in alliance formation. Specifically, this 
study focuses on whether a firm’s risk preference in regards to choice of high / low risk 
alliances is dependent on the firm’s relative performance to its reference point or 
aspiration level. 
The distance from a firm’s reference point or aspiration level of return impacts a 
firm’s strategic choice over different risky alliances because the different alliances make 
different contributions to a firm’s return. Because high risk alliance focuses on basic 
research and development, such as drug discovery in pharmaceutical industry, it 
provides a new source of opportunity for a firm’s return (Koza & Lewin, 1998; 
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). The discovery of a new opportunity is important to sustain 
a firm’s return in a competitive market because competitors increasingly undermine the 
foundation of its current return (Hitt, Ireland, Camp, & Sexton, 2001; Venkataraman & 
Sarasvathy, 2001). Conversely, low risk alliance provides refinement of a current 
opportunity to which involve activities that targets commercialization such as marketing 
and sales to which yield more immediate but incremental returns to a firm (Koza & 
Lewin, 1998; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004).  
High and low risk alliances have different impacts on a firm’s returns (Gulati, 
1998; Ireland et al., 2002). Namely, high risk alliance is more likely to yield greater 
returns than low risk alliances because high risk alliances can enhances a firm’s 
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competitive position or market power.  In other words, because the number of partners in 
a R&D related agreement is relatively more limited than in a sales or marketing related 
agreement, the high risk alliance enables the firm to access relatively more rare 
resources (Zucker, Darby, & Brewer, 1998). High risk alliance thereby prevents its 
competitors’ access to critical resources than the low risk alliance due to such limits in 
the number of partners (Silverman & Baum, 2002; Zucker et al, 1998). 
Hence, in accordance to the logic of prospect theory, when a firm’s return falls 
below its reference point, the situation is more likely to reflect a declining competitive 
position. Thereby, greater efforts are made to seek a new opportunity to restoring a 
firm’s declining competitive position. High risk alliances are more likely to be chosen to 
discover new opportunities because they provide new sources of competitive advantage. 
This is also supported by an empirical finding that the tendency to take more risky 
actions is higher in troubled firms (Bowman, 1982; Bromiley, 1991; Greve, 1998; 
Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996). On the contrary, when a firm’s return exceeds the 
reference point, a firm’s competitive position is thereby being rewarded by the market 
and thereby requires no further development. Firms are more likely to focus on refining 
or exploiting the current opportunity. Thereby, low risk alliance that leverages a firm’s 
existing competitive advantage is more likely to be chosen when a firm’s return exceeds 
the reference point. As a result consistent with prospect theory (e.g., Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) and behavioral theory of firm (e.g., March & Shapira, 1987), a firm 
undertakes more risky alliance (i.e. risk taking) when its return falls below its reference 
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point. Conversely, a firm undertakes less risky alliances when a firm’s return exceeds its 
reference point. We hypothesize these arguments. 
 Hypothesis 1a: A firm’s risk taking in alliance formation – the ratio of high risk 
alliance formation to total alliances – will be increased as a firm’s return falls below its 
reference point.  
 Hypothesis 1b: A firm’s risk aversion in alliance formation – the ratio of low risk 
alliance formation to total alliances – will be increased as its return exceeds its 
reference point.  
 A firm’s risk preference is influenced by its reference point or aspirations. 
However, since this reference point or aspirations is influenced by a firm’s past 
experiences, the firm’s risk preference is likely to be influenced by its past experience. 
The next section thereby examines this past experience effect on a firm’s risk preference.   
 
The Effect of Risk Taking Experience on Alliance Formation 
According to prospect theory and behavioral theory a firm’s risk preference is 
dependent on its reference point or aspiration level and thereby as the reference point or 
aspiration level is changed the risk preference is also likely to be changed. A firm’s 
reference point or aspiration level is often determined based on a ‘comparison to relevant 
others (i.e., industry norm or average) or to its own past performance’ (Bromiley et al., 
2001; Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 1998; Lant, 1992). Lehner’s (2000) used both 
industrial average and individual firm’s prior performance in empirically estimating the 
reference point. As a firm’s past performance is continually increased, the firm’s 
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reference point or aspiration level will be increased. However, a firm’s reference point or 
aspiration level can also be highly influenced by ‘comparison to relevant others’, i.e., 
industry norm or average (Bromiley et al., 2001). Hence, the reference point or 
aspiration can be defined as a weighted function of both individual and industry 
performance. However, as argued in prior research, industrial norm or average has been 
generally utilized as a reference point implying that industrial average has a greater 
weight in the estimation of the reference point than the individual performance 
(Bromiley et al., 2001).  
Thereby, a firm’s new technology development experience that impacts its 
performance can have different influence on its risk preference depending on the 
characteristics of the technology. That is, whether the firm’s new technology was similar 
or dissimilar to its prior technology may have different impacts on its future risk 
preference. Although both technologies, similar or dissimilar technology, may have 
positive impact on a firm’s performance and as a result increase its reference point, the 
dissimilar technology is more likely to have significant increase in the performance. This 
is because dissimilar technology is less likely to be imitated by a firm’s competitors than 
the similar technology. Increase in performance through such technology, thereby, is 
more likely to lead to a level of performance that exceeds a firm’s aspirations, especially 
aspirations that are influenced by industry norms or average. As a result of such 
technology development, the firm is less likely to increase its risk taking in developing a 
new dissimilar or innovative technology.  
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Furthermore, through a firm’s history of new technology development, we can 
examine the effect of firm’s prior risk taking (or risk aversion) experience, such as their 
prior technology choices, on a firm’s preference for high and low risk alliance. This is 
because the new technology development can be interpreted as risk taking or risk 
aversion depending on whether the new technology is similar or dissimilar to the firm’s 
prior technologies. The dissimilar technologies are relatively more difficult to develop 
and their expected return is also relatively more uncertain. Thereby, the development of 
a new technology dissimilar to a firm’s prior technologies can be regarded as risk taking 
experience while a similar technology development is regarded as risk aversion 
experience. This is because improving or refining a current technology is less uncertain 
and less expensive than developing a new technology which is dissimilar to a firm’ 
current technology (Danneels, 2002, 2007; Lavie, 2006). Furthermore, the improvement 
of current technology is relatively easier due to learning curve (experience) advantages 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Danneels, 2002, 2007; Lavie, 2006; Levinthal & March, 
1993). Therefore, we can argue the effect of a firm’s risk taking experience on the firm’s 
risk preference in alliance formation through utilizing its new technology development 
experience as follows.   
 Hypothesis 2: Risk taking experience in a new technology development has a 
negative impact on the risk taking in future alliance formation, i.e., the ratio of 





 Since a firm’s relative return to the reference point or aspiration level is a key to 
explaining risk preference in prospect theory or behavioral theory, we start with giving 
the explanation of the estimation of a firm’s ‘Relative return to a reference point 
(RRRP)’ which is deviation from a firm’s reference point. RRRP is constructed as the 
difference between a firm’s current return on asset (ROA) and the reference point. In 
developing measures for the reference point, it is commonly constructed with an industry 
median return or a full sample average return. However, this study follows Lehner’s 
(2000) approach to find the reference point because his approach is directly based on 
prospect theory (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; Lehner, 2000). Furthermore, his 
approach is better suited to risk preference research because the approach considers 
possibilities of shifts of individual reference level in the estimation of the reference point. 
That is, he relaxed an assumption about “common reference level for all firms of an 
industry” by more directly considering shift of individual reference point in his measure 
(Lehner, 2000: 63). Technically we more strongly supported his approach by adopting 
‘fixed effect panel data estimation’ to consider heterogeneous firms’ individual effect. 
Lehner’s (2000) identifies the reference point in three steps; 1) Estimation of a 
minimum risk point in the sample (Fiegenbaum et al., 1996; Lehner, 2000; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979), 2) finding the median point for the industry (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 
1988; Fiegenbaum, 1990) using COMPUSTAT database and 3) combination of above 
two points with a weight on each point. For the weight, he used the proportion of 
explained variance (R2) in the first regression model, i.e., equation 1, used to estimate the 
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minimum risk point, because the estimator of the minimum risk point as a reference 
point will be weak in meaning if the fit (R2) of the model is low. In other words, the 
reference point is calculated with the following equation; 
IMD*)R-(1  RMP*R  RP 2e
2
n += , where RPn is  the R
2
 weighted reference point, 
RMPe is an estimated risk minimum point of a firm’s ROA from the sample, and IMD is 
an industry-median ROA, in which 
2
R is the proportion of explained variance in the 
regression model. Because the measure of fit, R2, has a tendency to increase as more 
right hand variables are added in a model, we used the adjusted R2 as an alternative, 







*)R-(1-1 R 22  , where T is the number of total 
observations and k is the number of parameters in the model (Gujarati, 2002).  
The regression model for the estimated minimum risk point is shown in the 
equation 1. This equation is estimating the U-shaped relationship between the risk and 
return. Equation 1: itititit VQQd +++= −− 212110 ** ααα , 02 ≥α , where itd  is the 
square root of 2itd  which is the mean of quadratic differences over past five years 
(  −−= 212 ][4
1
ititit QQd ), as a representation of firm risk, i.e., volatility of ROA at time t 
(Bromiley et al., 2001; Lehner, 2000; Ruefli et al., 1999). As right hand side variables, 
1−itQ  is a firmi ’s ROA at time t-1, Vit = ai + Uit , and ai is the fixed effect component of 
error term, Vit,  i = 1, 2, 3 … 97, t = 1, 2 … 5. We used a fixed effect model of panel data 
because risk may be distinct depending on each firm and there will be an unobservable 
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firm-based factor such as each firm’s different experience (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Sitkin 
& Weingart, 1995). Even though the 2itd  is known as twice the variance of the time 
series when there is no autocorrelation and trend (i.e., stationary time series), this 
measure of risk is better than the return’s variance, a traditional risk measure. This is 
because statistically the mean quadratic difference is not dependent on the return’s mean 
and thereby the statistical correlation between the mean and variance is avoided, which 
has been one of criticism in the traditional risk measure (Bromiley, 1991; Bromiley et al., 
2001; Lehner, 2000; Ruefli, 1990, 1991; Ruefli et al., 1999). The estimation result of this 
equation as in the table 3 shows that the computed value for the reference point (RPn) is -
29.161 of ROA17. Given this point the RRRP is thus constructed as the difference in a 
firm’s return (ROA) from this reference point.  
 
Data and Sample 
To examine a firm’s risk preference towards alliance formation, this study’s 
hypotheses are empirically examined in the pharmaceutical industry. This is because 
alliances of various degrees of risk have been reported in the pharmaceutical industry 
(e.g. Powell et al., 1996; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004, 2006). To examine alliances in this 
industry alliance data was drawn from Bioscan (American Health). Bioscan has been 
used in various pharmaceutical studies (e.g. Deeds & Hill, 1996; Powell et al., 1996; 
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Shan et al., 1994). To develop a firm’s reference 
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The Result of Estimation to Find the Minimum Risk 
 Risk in return 
   
Constant 0.353291*** (0.089296) 
ROA 0.335805*** (0.086695) 
ROA2 0.001294** (0.000479) 
Firm Age -2.090593*** (0.048486) 
Firm Size 0.450813*** (0.079814) 
   
R-squared (R2) 0.082269 
Adjusted R-squared ( 2R ) 0.066714 
Sum of squared residuals 42696.65 
J-statistic 24.92468 
Standard errors in parentheses. <  p < 0.1,  * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001 
 
point, financial data from the COMPUSTAT database of Standard and Poor (e.g. 
Lehner, 2000), and Mergent Online were used. To examine a firm’s experience in 
advancing a new technology, the patent database of United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) were used (e.g. McGrath & Nerkar, 2004; Nooteboom, 
Haverbeke, Duysters, Gilsing, & van den Oord, 2007; Zhang et al., 2007).  
From these data sources, a panel data set of public pharmaceutical firms was 
constructed with 6 years of data from 1999 to 200418. Over this sample period 326 bio 
and pharmaceutical firms were identified in the Bioscan data base. However, since the  
                                                 
18
 Because the date of the Bioscan data used in the study was not the end of December a given year, we 
used the 2005 Bioscan data to fully include a firm’s activities such as alliance formation of year 2004. The 
dependent variable of the current study is a longitudinal data from 2000 to 2004.    
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focus is only on pharamaceutical firms, 105 of the 326 firms with standard industrial 
classification (SIC) code of 2834 (‘pharmaceutical preparations’ (Rothaermel, 2001)) 
were used in this study’s sample. This subsample (SIC 2834) has been used in various 
empirical studies (e.g., Markman et al., 2004; Rothaermel, 2001). Furthermore, this 
sample was restricted to this industry category because all firms in this subsector 
involve the development of drugs that are subject to FDA regulations. 8 firms were 
also removed because of missing alliance data. This resulted in a panel data set of 97 
firms over the period of 1999 to 200419.  
The panel data set is advantageous for empirical research of this type because it 
increases the degrees of freedom and reduces the collinearity among explanatory 
variables and thereby improving the efficiency of econometric estimates (Hsiao, 1986). 
In addition, panel data estimations, such as ‘fixed effect estimations’, can account for 
unobserved heterogeneity in the statistical analysis (Cameron, 1998). Since our unit of 
analysis is focused on the firm level, a high degree of unobserved heterogeneity is 
expected among firms in the sample. More specifically, a firm’s given explanatory 
variables, such as the firm’s return relative to its reference point, and risk taking in a 
technology development, are expected to be significantly affected by the firm’s own 
unobserved features such as different resources and experience. Furthermore, ANOVA 
test also shows that there is very significant fixed effect (Baltagi, 2001; Hsiao, 1986).  
 
                                                 
19
 The firms and years in this panel data set are same as those of 2nd essay of my dissertation. However, 
specific variables, such as dependent variables and explanatory variables, of this study are all different 
from those of 2nd essay. 
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Dependent Variables 
Risk preference in alliance formation; risk taking and risk aversion. A firm’s 
choice of different risk alliances reflects its risk preference. Risk preference is measured 
by the ratio of high (or low) risk alliance to total alliances. Specifically, the risk taking is 
constructed by the ratio of high risk alliance to total alliance while the risk aversion is 
constructed by the ratio of low risk alliance to total alliance. In drawing on empirical 
measures, the high risk alliance is a count measure of the sum of the following types of 
agreements found in Bioscan: basic research, drug discovery and development. While, 
low risk alliances is a count measure of the sum of commercializing agreements that 
consists of clinical trials, FDA regulatory process, and marketing and sales (Rothaermel 
& Deeds, 2004: 209-210). 
 The key equation we estimate is as follows. Because this equation (equation 2) is 
estimated to see the effect of the explanatory variables on the risk preference - risk 
taking and risk aversion- in alliance formation, equation 2 is distinct to the equation 1. 
The purpose of equation 1 is to get RRRP measure for equation 2. The hypotheses of this 
study will be tested with results of the equation 2. 
Equation 2: Risk preference t+1 = 0β  + 1β *RRRP_below t + 2β *RRRP_above t + 
3β *Risk taking in technology t + Β *Control variables t + itΓ  , 
where Risk preference t+1 is a firm’s risk taking and risk averse choices of alliance risk, 
RRRP_below t is the firm’s performance (ROA) that falls below the reference point, 
RRRP_above t is the firm’s performance (ROA) that falls above  the reference point, 
Risk taking in technology t is a firm’s experience in undertaking new technological 
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developments, B is coefficients of control variables and itΓ = iti Φ+γ , in which iγ is a 
heterogeneous firm’s fixed effect component of error term itΓ , i = 1, 2, 3…97, t = 1, 
2…5. We estimate one equation for risk taking and another for risk aversion. We 
compared the results to test hypotheses.  
 
Explanatory Variables  
Relative return to a reference point (RRRP). Based on Lehner’s (2000) 
approach to find the reference point, the RRRP is constructed by the difference between 
a firm’s current return on asset (ROA) and the estimated reference point. RRRP thereby 
takes negative and positive values that respectively indicate a low and high RRRP. We 
used notation of RRRP_above and RRRP_below for the high and low RRRP respectively.  
Risk taking in a new technology development. A firm’s risk taking in a new 
technology is constructed by counting the number of patents in a new field in which a 
firm has not created any patents during the past 5 years. Specifically, the patents that “a 
firm successfully filed for in year t within patent classes in which the firm has not been 
active in the 5 years prior to the given year” are counted (Nooteboom et al, 2007:1022). 
However, we constructed a ratio of such patents’ classes over the total number of classes 
to represent a firm’s choice for risk taking in a new technology development. The 5-year 
window is also common in the related literature that attempted to proxy a firm’s 
innovativeness in a new technology development (Ahuja, 2000; Henderson & Cockburn, 
1996; Nooteboom et al, 2007; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Stuart & Podolny, 1996; 
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Silverman & Baum, 2002). The data of patents were collected from United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) database.  
 
Control Variables  
As the formation of a firm’s alliances (high / low risk) can be influenced by other 
than prospect theory explanation, we have controlled for other explanations. We 
controlled for a firm’s size and age which are most common control variables in alliance 
formation research. The size and age may have influential effects on the formation of 
high / risk alliances because larger and older firms have more resources and experience 
than smaller and younger firms (Park et al., 2002; Park & Zhou, 2005). As a result, with 
greater resources and experiences, these firms are more likely to support the costs and 
experiences required for high risk alliances. The firm size is measured by the number of 
employee, while a firm age was measured based on its founding year (e.g. Powell et al., 
1996; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004, 2006; Shan et al., 1994; Silverman & Baum, 2002).  
 
Model Specification and Estimation 
Our data set is a panel data which consist of 6 years of 97 cross-sectional units. 
Because the 97 pharmaceutical firms may have their own unique characteristics, such as 
unique resources and capabilities, which are not easily observable (Barney, 1991) but 
can have a statistically significant effect (Powell et al., 1996), panel data analysis 
especially with fixed effect estimation is appropriate (Baltagi, 2001; Hsiao, 1986; Powell 
et al., 1996). Specifically, we use fixed effect estimation of this panel data because 
 107 
random effect estimation are based on an assumption that individual effects are 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, i.e., if unobserved effects are correlated with 
the explanatory variables, the random effects estimators are inconsistent (Baltagi, 2001; 
Cameron, 1998; Mundlak, 1978).  
The panel data was estimated through a generalized method of moment (GMM) 
estimation with consideration of fixed effects on each firm because GMM is a relatively 
robust estimation method. That is, GMM does not require any exact distribution 
assumptions on the disturbance terms while maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), a 
popular estimation method, requires an exact distribution assumption to estimate a 
model. In addition, many common estimators such as OLS, IV, 2SLS and even MLE are 
special cases of GMM (Hamilton, 1994).  
The GMM draws out the estimates of parameters with which the correlations 
between disturbances and instrumental variables are as close to zero as possible. 
However, the validity of the instrumental variables should be tested when the number of 
instrumental variable is greater than the number of coefficient estimated (Newey & West, 
1987a). Because researchers usually use the lagged variables of explanatory variables 
including constant term (e.g. Hansen & Singleton, 1982), this study also adopted this 
approach. Because GMM can be also robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
with a proper weighting matrix (Newey & West, 1987b), this study uses the 
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heteroskedasticity robust GMM.20 We used EVIWS 5.1 of Quantitative Micro Software 
(QMS), an econometric analysis package, for the whole estimations and statistical tests. 
   
Estimation Result 
 For our examined variables, table 4 shows their means, standard deviations, and 
bivariate correlations. The descriptive statistics shows that the high risk alliances on 
average reflect 43% of the sample. The average firm of our sample data is also 35 years 
old and has 11640 employees. The average firm’s risk, i.e., volatility of its return, is 
28.643 and the new field classes of the average firm’s patent reach 53% of total classes. 
The average return on asset (ROA) is -19.159. The average size of deviation below the 
reference point is 10.426 and the average size of deviation above the reference point is 
20.428. The descriptive statistic table shows that the correlation between a firm’s ROA 
and the size of deviations from the reference point is high because the deviations, 
RRRP_Below and RRRP_Above, are constructed by the difference between a firm’s 
current ROA and its reference point. Readers should however note that these variables 
(ROA and RRRP_Below, or ROA and RRRP_Above) are not used concurrently in any 
model. 
 The hypotheses were tested by estimating equation 2 through GMM method. 
Their results are shown in Table 5. The hypothesis 1a and 1b were used to examine 
                                                 
20
 We also checked autocorrelation with error terms of the equations, i.e. whether the error term itE  
= iti U+δ  and ititit UU ερ += −1 , in which iδ is a heterogeneous firm’s fixed effect component of 
error term itE . The ρ  was not significant at 5% significance level with suggestion of no autocorrelation.  
Table 4 
The Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Risk taking  
in alliance formation 0.428  0.310  1.000         
2. Firm Age 35.232  44.361  0.041  1.000        
3. Firm size 11.636  25.874  0.191  0.592  1.000       
4. Risk in return 28.634  32.372  -0.147  -0.359  -0.333  1.000      
5. Success experience 
in risk taking 0.529  0.308  0.039  0.064  0.111  -0.195  1.000     
6. ROA -19.159  37.587  0.037  0.383  0.381  -0.492  0.081  1.000    
7. RRRP_Below -10.426  26.047  0.064  0.181  0.179  -0.400  0.048  0.911  1.000   
8. RRRP_Above 20.428  17.520  -0.016  0.551  0.552  -0.461  0.102  0.791  0.468  1.000  
S.D. is standard deviation. ROA has high correlations with RRRP_Below and RRRP_Above because RRRP_Below and RRRP_Above are constructed 
by the difference between a firm’s current ROA and its reference point. But they (ROA and RRRP_Below, or ROA and RRRP_Above) are not used 







The Result of Estimation on Risk Preference in Alliance Formation 
Variable Risk taking Risk avoiding 
     
Constant 1.8136*** (0.4334) -0.78829 (0.6457) 
Relative Return below 
Reference Point -0.00129*** (0.0002) 0.00129*** (0.0002) 
Relative Return above 
Reference Point -0.00896*** (0.0021) 0.00885** (0.0028) 
Risk Taking Experience 
 in a New Technology -0.94751* (0.3852) 0.9631 =  (0.4940) 
Firm Age -0.01808 (0.0128) 0.01771 (0.0162) 
Firm Size -0.00188 (0.0071) 0.00079 (0.0114) 
   
R-squared (R2) 0.69675 0.69294 
Adjusted R-squared ( 2R ) 0.45195 0.44506 
Sum of squared residuals 3.84165 3.88992 
J-statistic 2.09389 2.10801 
Standard errors in parentheses. >  p < 0.1,  * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001. 
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whether the study’s use of prospect theory arguments are supported in alliance risk 
preference context. Specifically, hypothesis 1a was tested to determine whether risk 
taking in alliance formation increases as a firm’s return falls below its reference point. 
However, the interpretation should be carefully made because the value of the ‘relative 
return below the reference point’ (RRRP_below) is a ‘negative’ value21. The estimated 
result shown in table 5 shows that as a firm’s relative return below the reference point 
increases (i.e. smaller deviation from the reference point), the firm’s risk taking is 
significantly decreased at the significance level of 0.001 (i.e., 1β = - 0.001285, t-
statistic= 5.625679 for risk taking in alliance formation). Stated differently, as a firm’s 
return is departed away from below the reference point, the firm’s risk taking in alliance 
formation is significantly increased. That is, the increases in magnitude of departure 
form below reference point positively influence the incidence of high risk alliances. 
Furthermore, this is also consistent with a firm’s risk aversion in alliance formation. That 
is, to be consistent in logic, if the risk taking is increased, then the risk aversion should 
be decreased. The result supports the case of the risk aversion. Namely, the firm’s risk 
aversion is significantly decreased as a firm’s return falls away from below the reference 
point (i.e., 1β = 0.001290, t-statistic= 3.119383 for risk aversion in alliance). That is, 
the increase in the magnitude of departure from below the reference point negatively 
influences the incidence of low risk alliances. Thereby we can not reject the hypothesis 
1a. 
                                                 
21
 Hence, the increase in the nominal value of the relative return below the reference point (RRRP_below) 
means the decrease in the absolute value of the relative return. 
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 Hypothesis 1b was tested to determine whether risk aversion in a firm’s alliance 
formation increases as a firm’s return falls above the reference point. The estimation 
result shows that as a firm’s return exceeds the reference point, the risk aversion in 
alliance is significantly increased at the significance level of 0.01 (i.e., 2β = 0.008852, t-
statistic = 3.119383 for risk aversion in alliance). That is, the increase in the magnitude 
of departure from above the reference point has positive (negative) effect on risk 
aversion (risk taking) in alliance formation. Furthermore, this is also consistent with the 
result that the deviation from above the reference point has a significantly negative effect 
on risk taking in alliance formation at the 0.00l level of significance (i.e., 2β = -
0.008964, t-statistic = -4.297044 for risk taking in alliance). Thereby, we can not reject 
the hypothesis 1b.  
 The results of hypothesis 1a and 1b are depicted in figure 3. As Greve (1998) 
argued, this type of graph as in figure 3 can be utilized to support the reasoning of 
prospect theory or behavioral theory. That is, there is significant break in the slopes of 
risk preference depending on reference point implying that a firm’s risk preference is 
significantly changed at the reference point. Specifically, a firm’s risk taking in alliance 
formation is negatively sloped while risk aversion in alliance formation is positively 
sloped. However, common to both the risk taking and risk aversion curves, there is a 
‘break’ in their own slopes between below the reference point and above the reference 
point. The Wald test to examine the equality of coefficients, i.e., slopes, between the 
below the reference point and the above the reference point shows that the ‘break’ is 
significant (i.e., p=0.001, 1β = - 0.001285, 2β = -0.008964 for risk taking while 
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p=0.001, 1β =  0.001290, 2β = 0.008852 for risk aversion ). This means that as a firm’s 
return increases, risk taking (risk aversion) decreases (increases) more slowly below the 
reference point than above the reference point. Greve argued that “probability of change 
may decrease more slowly below the aspiration level” (1998: 61) due to inertial effect 
even though his empirical finding did not fully support it. This study finds support for 
this argument. This tendency is consistent with arguments of prior research, such as a 
firm’s preference for a current state to a new state (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) even to 
commitment to failing courses of action (Staw, 1976; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 
1981). Firms will keep taking high risks when a firm’s return is below its reference point 
or aspirations. That is, although a firm’s current strategic actions are not making profits 
as expected, the firm tends to be still committed to the actions even to harm the firm 
itself (Staw, 1976; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). This is in a sense consistent with 
empirical findings that troubled firms takes more risk which leads to worse performance 
(Bowman, 1982; Bromiley, 1991). However, this tendency of self reinforcing is 
drastically changed as the frame is changed from ‘loss’ to ‘gain’ as in prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Hence, the graphs in figure 3 are also consistent with 
prospect theory or behavioral theory as Greve (1998) argued. 
 The hypothesis 2 was also tested through estimating equation 3. As shown in 
table 5, the past risk taking experience in a new technology development has a 
significantly negative effect on high risk alliances (i.e., p=0.01, 3β = -0.94751, t-statistic 
= -2.459631 for risk taking in alliance formation). This is also supported by its positive 
effect on low risk alliance at a significance level of 0.1 ( 3β =0.963098, t-statistic = 
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1.94974 for risk avoiding in alliance formation). Thereby, we can not reject the 
hypothesis 2. This result is also consistent with prospect theory explanation whereby risk 
taking in alliance formation is decreased with accumulation of innovative technologies.     
 The estimation shown in table 5 also shows that control variables, such as firm 
age and firm size, have negative impacts on high risk alliances while positive impacts on 
low risk alliance though they are not statistically significant.  
 
Figure 3 



















DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 This study has examined a firm’s strategic risk behavior to address the ‘risk / 
return paradox’ in alliance formation. In particular, this study draws on prospect and 
related behavioral theories to give an explanation to the question of why firms form 
Relative return =  






highly risky alliance when they generate low returns. According to prospect and related 
behavioral theories, a firm’s risk preference, i.e., risk taking and risk aversion, is 
dependent on its returns relative to a reference point or aspiration level. This study 
empirically shows that such reasoning of prospect and related behavioral theory is 
applicable to alliance choices. That is, firms have a preference for taking on riskier 
alliances when a firm’s return falls below its reference point. Conversely, a firm’s risk 
aversion through its selection of low risk alliances tends to increase as a firm’s return 
falls from above the firm’s reference point. We also found that past risk taking in the 
development of a new technology reduced formation of high risk alliances.  
 This study offers an initial attempt to extend prospect and related behavioral 
theory arguments to the study of risk preferences, as it relates to alliance choice. This 
study has contributed to alliance research at least in three aspects. First, to our 
knowledge, there is no empirical research about the relationship between risk preference 
and alliance formation. This has been partly because it is not easy to measure alliance 
risk (Arend, 2004; Bromiley et al., 2001; Das & Teng, 1996, 2001). To address this we 
classified the alliances into high and low risk alliances. We also assumed that a firm’s 
risk preference is embedded in its strategic choice. Second, a firm’s risk preference has 
not been considered as a factor that impacts in the formation of an alliance. This has 
been partly because risk attitude has been largely assumed to be as fixed as in the 
financial portfolio theory (Bromiley et al., 2001). Finally, the empirical study about the 
effect of past risk taking experience on future alliance formation was not conducted in 
alliance research. In that regard, this study also will contribute to the research stream 
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about the effect of experience on alliance formation (e.g. Anand & Khanna, 2000; 
Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Kale et al., 2002; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006; Zollo et al., 
2002).  
 This research also contributes to risk related research, especially prospect theory 
research. Because the prospect theory was originally based on individual risk behavior, 
the further extension of prospect theory to firm level research has been increasingly 
sought (e.g., Chang & Thomas, 1989; Fiegenbaum, 1990; Fiegenbaum et al, 1996; 
Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; Lehner, 2000; Singh, 1986). In that regard, this study 
contributes to the further extension of prospect theory by extending it to the examination 
of alliances.      
 However, there are also several limitations in this study which will be subjects of 
future research. First, although the classification of different risky alliances into high and 
low risk alliances is generally accepted in alliance research (e.g., Park et al., 2002; 
Powell et al., 1996; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), it may be too simplistic. As Miller and 
Bromiley (1990) argued, because different measures of risk may represent different 
dimensions of risk, the development of other risk measures to classify alliances would 
contribute to enhanced understanding of alliance risk. Finally, in future research, this 
study can be extended to examine inter-firm level validity of prospect theory because 




GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
  
This dissertation sought to address the shortcomings of resource based view 
(RBV) regarding the origins and processes of value creation (chapter II), the 
shortcomings of alliance management capability (AMC) approach regarding 
determinants of alliance formation (chapter III), and the shortcomings of traditional 
portfolio theory based approach regarding risk preference in alliance formation (chapter 
IV). Even though each chapter is distinct in its research objective, there are some 
relationships among the chapters. We discuss the relationships among the chapters here. 
 First of all, there are relationships between arguments of chapter II and chapter 
III at least in two aspects. The first thing is about the argument on a firms external 
competition. Chapter II predicated that competition has dual impacts on the opportunity 
of value creation that comes from cognitive and operational gaps of stakeholders. That is, 
due to competitive exploitation of the value opportunity, the opportunity is increasingly 
decreased, but as a result, there is also increase in the pressure on firms to create new 
value opportunities for their survival. We argued competition increases a firms creation 
of new value opportunities. The impact of the competition on alliance (chapter III) was 
revealed as promotion of alliance formation and especially the formation of explorative 
alliances because alliances, especially explorative alliances, serve to searching for new 
value opportunities (Koza & Lewin, 1998). That is, competition promotes the formation 
of alliances because by gaining access to new resources and experiences, firms can 
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develop new sources of value creation (e.g., Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Park et 
al., 2002; Patzelt et al., 2008; Shan, 1990). Especially, competition promotes the 
explorative alliances that promote coordination of diverse partnerships to which promote 
innovation (e.g. Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Shan et al., 
1994). The promotion of alliance formation and especially the formation of explorative 
alliance were empirically supported at chapter III. Thus there was consistency in 
argument on competition between chapter II and chapter III. 
The second relationship between arguments of chapter II and chapter III is about 
the function of a firms absorptive capacity. Chapter II asserted that a firms absorptive 
capacity serves to exploitation of value opportunity derived from a firms cognitive and 
operational gaps. The path dependency of a firms absorptive capacity encourages 
exploitation of its prior experience but rather prevents creation of new value 
opportunities. This impact of the absorptive capacity was revealed as promotion of 
formation of exploitive alliances but reduction of that of explorative alliances in the 
context of alliance (chapter III). The function of absorptive capacity in exploitation of 
value opportunity was consistently revealed in the context of alliance formation such as 
promotion of exploitive alliances.  
 With respect to the relationship between chapter III and chapter IV, a certain 
empirical finding in chapter III is closely related to a research question of chapter IV. 
Specifically speaking, despite the diminishing return effect of alliances, total alliance 
formation was monotonously increased regardless of a firm’s Relative AMC (RAMC). 
According to the logic of diminishing return effect of alliances, when a firm’s AMC falls 
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above the diminishing return point, firms will reduce or not increase further alliance 
formation. Yet, firms still increased the alliance formation even though their AMC 
already exceeded the diminishing point. This unexpected result raised a fundamental 
question of why a firm forms risky alliances with low return. Furthermore, explorative 
alliances which are more risky than exploitive alliances were more formed. Such a 
finding raised a question against a traditional risk preference, such as in financial 
portfolio theory. Such research question was addressed by the study in chapter IV. That 
is, when a firm’s return falls below its reference point or aspiration level, the firm forms 
the high risk alliance with low return as expected in prospect theory and behavioral 
theory (e.g., Bromiley, 1991; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; March & Shapira, 1987). Furthermore, this tendency to form the high risk alliance 
is reinforced when a firm’s return departs away from below its reference point or 
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EXAMPLES OF SUBCLASSES OF A PATENT WITH CLASS OF 424 
Class Subclass Description 
424 








IMMUNOGLOBULIN, ANTISERUM, ANTIBODY, OR ANTIBODY 
FRAGMENT, EXCEPT CONJUGATE OR COMPLEX OF THE SAME WITH 
NONIMMUNOGLOBULIN MATERIAL 
 131.1 Anti-idiotypic 
 132.1 Derived from transgenic multicellular eukaryote (e.g., plant, etc.) 
 133.1 Structurally-modified antibody, immunoglobulin, or fragment thereof (e.g., 
chimeric, humanized, CDR-grafted, mutated, etc.) 
 
134.1 
Antibody, immunoglobulin, or fragment thereof fused via peptide linkage to 
nonimmunoglobulin protein, polypeptide, or fragment thereof (i.e., antibody or 
immunoglobulin fusion protein or polypeptide) 
 135.1 Single chain antibody 
 136.1 Bispecific or bifunctional, or multispecific or multifunctional, antibody or fragment thereof 
 137.1 Binds specifically-identified oligosaccharide structure 
 138.1 Binds expression product or fragment thereof of cancer-related gene (e.g., 
oncogene, proto-oncogene, etc.) 








Reduced antigenicity, reduced ability to bind complement, or reduced numbers of 
activated complement components (e.g., free from aggregated, denatured, 




CONJUGATE OR COMPLEX OF MONOCLONAL OR POLYCLONAL 




Conjugated via claimed linking group, bond, chelating agent, or coupling agent 
(e.g., conjugated to proteinaceous toxin via claimed linking group, bond, coupling 
agent, etc.) 
 180.1 Conjugate includes potentiator or composition comprising conjugate includes potentiator 
 181.1 Conjugated to nonproteinaceous bioaffecting compound (e.g., conjugated to 
cancer-treating drug, etc.) 
 182.1 Conjugate includes potentiator; or composition comprising conjugate includes potentiator 










EXAMPLE OF CALCULATION OF COMPETITION EXTENT OF A FIRM 
Company Year Class/subclass USPTO Own Rival Repetition 
Firm A 2001 530/331 71 2 69 1 
  514/400 41 1 40 1 
  544/254 8 1 7 1 
  544/116 17 1 16 1 
  514/19 79 2 77 1 
  424/423 184 1 183 1 
  424/85.7 14 1 13 1 
  514/183 114 5  5 
  514/341 60 1 59 1 
  514/241 45 1 44 1 
  540/500 9 3 6 1 
  514/254.08 7 1 6 1 
  435/285.2 34 1 33 1 
  514/183 114 5  5 
  514/217.06 17 2 15 1 
  514/183 114 5  5 
  514/183 114 5  5 
  562/450 10 1 9 1 
  514/215 20 1 19 1 
  514/470 19 1 18 1 
  514/17 43 1 42 1 
  514/183 114 5 109 5 
  514/378 49 1 48 1 
  540/460 11 1 10 1 
    Average 41.15  
We modified (removed 10 patents) the patents of Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Inc. of 2001 to make an 
example. ‘Class/subclass’ is a firm’s individual patent’s class and subclass. ‘USPTO’ means total number 
of the patents with a specific class/subclass in the USPTO database while ‘Own’ means firm A’s number 
of the patent. ‘Rival’= ‘USPTO’ – ‘Own’. ‘Repetition’ indicates the number of same patents, i.e., patents 
with same class and subclass within the firm A. Note: a patent may have several class/subclass 
classifications by examiners of USPTO, but the first one, i.e. the first class/subclass is regarded as the 
patent’s main classification. However, we also considered second or third class/subclass for counting the 
‘Own’ in the above table because of its indirect relations. The patents which do not repeatedly appear on 
column of ‘Class/subclass’ but has more counts than 1 in the ‘Repetition’ is that kinds of patents.  
APPENDIX C 
CORRELATIONS AMONG Q-TRANSFORMED VARIABLES 
Variables Mean S.D. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
1.   Explorative alliance -0.05  2.75  1.00           
2.   Exploitive alliance -0.03  3.21  0.79  1.00          
3.   Age 0.09  1.38  -0.39  -0.42  1.00         
4.   Size 0.00  3.54  -0.33  -0.36  0.20  1.00        
5.   Technology diversity -0.01  1.48  0.07  0.20  -0.17  -0.05  1.00       
6.   Innovativeness 0.34  41.81  0.00  -0.07  0.02  0.06  0.22  1.00      
7.   RAMC_below 0.06  2.34  -0.43  -0.40  0.39  0.14  -0.16  0.00  1.00     
8.   RAMC_above 0.00  4.06  0.73  0.84  -0.32  -0.35  0.21  0.09  -0.21  1.00    
9.   R&D intensity 0.17  56.94  0.02  -0.01  0.02  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00   
10. Competition -2.18  154.32  0.04  0.07  -0.24  -0.01  0.06  -0.01  -0.09  0.04  -0.04  1.00  
Because the explorative alliances and exploitive alliances comprise a firm’s total alliances, they are highly corrected. We also checked whether the error 
terms of the two equations (the two variables are dependent variable at each equation) are contemporaneously correlated as in a seemingly unrelated 
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